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When people lie to obtain money, we call it theft.1 When they lie to enter 
private property, we call it trespass.2 When they lie to obtain sex . . . we have no 
idea what to call it. Some call it lawful seduction.3 Others call it criminal rape.4 
An Israeli court recently aligned itself with the latter camp when it convicted an 
Arab man of rape-by-deception for falsely claiming that he was a Jewish bache-
 
1.  See, e.g., State v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 1996) (holding that the defendant 
could be convicted of theft by deception for obtaining property by issuing a check 
that he never had an intention to pay).  
2.  See, e.g., Mayfield Heights v. Riddle, 670 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) 
(asserting that a defendant is liable for criminal trespass by deception when she is 
“aware either that a false impression is created or perpetuated or, knowing that the 
victim holds a false impression, withholds or prevents the victim from obtaining 
information to the contrary”).  
3.  See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 392 (1994) (“Seduction, even when 
honeycombed with lies that would convict the man of fraud if he were merely try-
ing to obtain money, is not rape.”). 
4.  See, e.g., Tom Dougherty, No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rape-
by-deception,” 123 YALE L.J. F. 321, 333 (2013) (“[W]e should reluctantly accept that 
someone can be guilty of rape-by-deception by [obtaining sex as a result of] falsely 
saying he went to Yale.”). 
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lor in order to have sex with a Jewish woman.5 So too did a Scottish court when 
it convicted a transgendered man of “sexual intimacy by fraud” for failing to 
reveal his gender history to his girlfriend.6 In contrast, a grand jury in New Jer-
sey sided with those who call lying to obtain sex an act of lawful seduction when 
it refused to indict a man for sexual assault for having sex with his fiancée after 
lying about his nationality, profession, and marital status.7 In response, New 
Jersey Assemblyman Troy Singleton sought to amend the state’s rape laws to 
include a crime of sex obtained by fraud or deception.8 Assemblyman Singleton 
challenged those who opposed the bill to ask themselves: should the law “afford 
less legal protection to a person’s body than it does to that person’s property?”9 
After all, he asked, “if it is a crime to deceive individuals out of their property, 
how can it be lawful to deceive them out of their bodies?”10 The criminal case 
and subsequent bill sparked a national conversation and a healthy dose of 
scholarly commentary on the limits of rape law and the fuzzy line between 
permissible sex and unlawful rape.11 
 
5. Jeffrey Heller, Israel Jails Arab in “Sex Through Fraud” Case, REUTERS (July 21, 
2010, 8:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-sex-idUSTRE66K2EG 
20100721 [http://perma.cc/Z5XH-ALXE]. 
6. Sex Fraud Woman Put on Probation, BBC (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-22078298 [http://perma.cc/566W-
RLA7]. 
7.  Most U.S. states do not generally criminalize sex by fraud. Instead, the majority 
criminalize deception that amounts to “fraud in the factum” as opposed to “fraud 
in the inducement.” Fraud in the factum occurs when the defendant’s deception 
causes the victim to believe that she is consenting to an act that is not sexual inter-
course. The classic example is that of a physician who tells the victim that he will 
insert a medical instrument inside her vagina and instead sexually penetrates her. 
In contrast, fraud in the inducement takes place when the defendant’s deception 
persuades the victim to have sex, but does not cause the victim to believe that she 
is consenting to something other than intercourse. For a more detailed discussion 
of the distinction, see infra Section IV.C.  
8.  Matt Friedman, Rape by Fraud? N.J. Lawmaker Introduces Bill To Make it a Crime, 
NJ.COM (Nov. 24, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/ 
11/rape_by_fraud_nj_lawmaker_introduces_bill_to_make_it_a_crime.html 
[http://perma.cc/7VNM-TYG8]. For the text of the bill, see A. 3908, 216th Leg., 
(N.J. 2014), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A4000/3908_I1.PDF [http:// 
perma.cc/KTM9-MH7T].  
9.  Sexual Assault and the Evolution of Modern Law, SUPPORT ASSEMBLYMAN TROY 
SINGLETON (May 7, 2015), www.troysingleton.com/sexual_assault_and_the_  
evolution_of_modern_law [http://perma.cc/YQ9P-3F2H].  
10.  Id. 
11.  For discussions of the New Jersey rape-by-deception bill in the media, see Eliza-
beth Nolan Brown, Lying to a Lover Could Become ‘Rape’ in New Jersey, REASON 
(Nov. 25, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/11/25/lying-to-get-someone-
in-bed-could-be-cri [http://perma.cc/Y2DX-7GLG]; Friedman, supra note 8; 
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Why is it so difficult to classify sex obtained by lies as either lawful seduc-
tion or criminal sexual assault? In an influential recent article titled The Riddle 
of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, Professor Jed Ruben-
feld suggested that our ambivalence towards punishing sex by deception is the 
product of a deep fissure in current rape law.12 More specifically, he claimed 
that the refusal to broadly criminalize sex by deception is in tension with the 
modern conception of rape as unconsented-to sex. If modern rape laws define 
rape as sex without consent, why does sex that is obtained as a result of decep-
tion not satisfy the definition of the offense? Expressed in more general terms, if 
contemporary rape statutes seek to protect sexual autonomy, why do these laws 
leave sex by deception largely unpunished? After all, deception typically negates 
consent outside of rape law, and choices that are the product of deception are 
generally viewed to be incompatible with autonomy. 
In light of this tension, Rubenfeld contends that contemporary rape re-
formers must grapple with what seems like an unsolvable riddle. If they want to 
hold on to autonomy as the linchpin of rape law, they should broadly criminal-
ize rape-by-deception. On the other hand, if they want to punish rape-by-
deception only in exceptional cases, they should admit that rape statutes do not 
primarily seek to enhance sexual autonomy. The challenge presented by this 
riddle extends well beyond the narrow confines of rape-by-deception. If there 
are strong reasons against broadly criminalizing sex obtained by fraud, and if 
the selective criminalization of rape-by-deception is truly incompatible with the 
modern definition of rape as nonconsensual sexual intercourse, then both the 
definition of rape and the rationale that justifies its criminalization are in need 
of a significant overhaul. The riddle of rape-by-deception thus threatens to un-
ravel the theoretical edifice upon which contemporary rape law is built. 
This Article argues that the riddle of rape-by-deception is based on a mis-
understanding of the kind of autonomy that lies at the heart of modern rape re-
form statutes. Properly understood, the chief goal of contemporary rape laws is 
to neutralize the coercion inherent in sexual relationships that take place in a 
male-dominated society. Since minimizing deception is only tangentially relat-
ed to this goal, respect for the kind of sexual autonomy that rape law is primari-
ly designed to protect is compatible with selective criminalization of rape-by-
deception. This solution to the riddle of rape-by-deception not only preserves 
the conceptual framework that undergirds modern rape statutes, but also 
sharpens our understanding of the interests that contemporary rape reform is 
designed to protect. 
 
Amanda Marcotte, The Drastic Overreach of the “Rape by Fraud” Bill, SLATE (Nov. 
25, 2014, 1:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/11/25/_rape_by 
_fraud_bill_in_new_jersey_bad_for_legitimate_sexual_assault_legislation.html 
[http://perma.cc/DM6V-35GT]. For scholarly discussions regarding rape-by-
deception, see Collection, Responses to Jed Rubenfeld’s Riddle of Rape-By-
Deception, 123 YALE L.J. F. 321 (2013). 
12. Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 
122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013).  
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The argument proceeds in four parts. In order to set the stage for a discus-
sion of the kind of autonomy that undergirds modern rape reform and Ruben-
feld’s formulation of the riddle of rape-by-deception, Part I explores the nature 
and scope of autonomy both outside and within rape law. What emerges is a 
variety of changing and competing conceptions of consent that promote differ-
ent degrees of autonomy depending on the circumstances and the conflicting 
interests at stake in any given interaction. 
Part II shows that comprehending the multidimensional nature of consent 
and autonomy sharpens our understanding of the core commitments underly-
ing the modern rape reform movement and contemporary scholarship on rape 
law. A close reading of this literature, along with an understanding of the his-
torical and cultural backdrop against which rape scholars were working at the 
time, reveals that modern rape reformers were chiefly interested in changing 
social and legal views regarding the kinds of pressures that ought to vitiate con-
sent to sex. That is, modern rape reform was primarily about securing added 
(female) freedom from (male) coercion, both subtle and overt, and expanding 
the meaning of coercion beyond the patriarchal notion of physical force. More 
broadly, feminist rape scholarship highlighted the inherently coercive nature of 
all sex in a patriarchal society, thus calling into question the possibility of any 
kind of consensual intercourse in a male-dominated culture. 
Part III solves the riddle of rape-by-deception. It argues that much of the 
confusion surrounding rape law in general and the riddle of rape-by-deception 
in particular is the product of a fundamental misunderstanding of the concep-
tual nature of autonomy and consent and of the kind of autonomy that lies at 
the heart of the modern rape reform movement.13 More specifically, the failure 
 
13.  Consent in rape law generates much confusion, including the classic confusion 
regarding whether consent ought to be viewed primarily as a mental state, such as 
subjectively wanting to engage in a certain act, or as a performative act that exter-
nally communicates willingness to engage in certain conduct. For a lucid analysis 
of the confusion generated by these competing views of consent, see Aya Gruber, 
Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (2016).  
While it is important to address this confusion, the conception of consent ad-
vanced in this Article holds regardless of whether consent is viewed as a mental 
state or as an act that communicates acquiescence. To determine the moral import 
of a mental state such as desiring to engage in certain conduct, it is necessary to 
examine whether the desire was a product of coercion, whether it was formed on 
the basis of faulty information, and whether the subject was competent enough for 
the desire to have moral or legal weight. Regarding scalarity, desires that are the 
product of less coercion, heightened information, and maximal competency are 
more robust than desires that are the consequence of more coercion, less infor-
mation, and diminished competency. The same can be said about the view of con-
sent as an external act that communicates agreement. To assess the weight that will 
be placed on an external manifestation of agreement, one must consider the extent 
to which the communication was coerced, sufficiently informed, and competent. 
Communications that are less coerced, more informed, and maximally competent 
are more robust than manifestations that are more coerced, less informed, and 
minimally competent. Given that the claims regarding the multidimensionality 
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to grasp that modern rape reform primarily focused on enhancing the non-
coercive dimension of autonomy prevents scholars from appreciating that 
drawing lines in the context of rape-by-deception serves to recognize different 
spheres and degrees of autonomy rather than to undermine the concept of au-
tonomy writ large. Once this is fully appreciated, there is little tension between 
opposing the broad criminalization of sex by deception and the kind of sexual 
autonomy that lies at the core of contemporary rape reform. 
After solving the so-called riddle of rape-by-deception, Part IV suggests 
some framing principles that can provide guidance to courts and legislatures 
when deciding whether to criminalize sex obtained by deception. Without in-
tending to exhaustively cover all of the cases in which it is sensible to punish sex 
obtained by misrepresentations, I argue that obvious candidates for criminaliza-
tion are cases that feature deception that is also coercive, deception that 
amounts to a breach of trust by a person in a position of authority, and decep-
tion that causes significant harm in addition to the infringement of the victim’s 
autonomy. The suggested approach would only selectively criminalize sex ob-
tained by deception. Contrary to what Rubenfeld suggests, such selective crimi-
nalization is not in tension with the kind of sexual autonomy that modern rape 
statutes seek to protect. As a result, the so-called riddle of rape-by-deception 
turns out not to be much of a riddle at all. 
 
I. Autonomy, Consent, and the Riddle of Rape-by-Deception 
 
A. The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception 
 
According to Professor Jed Rubenfeld, the widespread resistance to crimi-
nalizing rape by fraud reveals a deep tension in modern rape law and scholar-
ship.14 In his view, modern approaches to sexual assault law view the crime of 
rape as an affront to the victim’s sexual autonomy.15 This view of rape inspired 
many scholars and reformers to argue that rape should be regarded as a crime 
against (sexual) freedom instead of as a crime of (physical) violence.16 By focus-
ing on the injury to the victim’s sexual autonomy, these scholars argued with 
some success that the force requirement should be dropped from rape statutes, 
given that the essence of the crime is not forcible sex but rather nonconsensual 
sex.17 
 
and scalarity of consent do not depend on whether consent is viewed as a mental 
state or as a communicative act, this Article takes no position regarding whether 
consent ought to be viewed as a mental or performative act.  
14. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1379.  
15.  Id. 
16.  See generally Stephen Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and 
Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35 (1992). 
17.  Id. at 77. 
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Shifting the focus of rape from violence to autonomy allowed scholars to 
argue that rape should be redefined as engaging in sex without consent.18 But—
as Rubenfeld cleverly argues—this superficially unimpeachable view of rape as a 
crime against sexual autonomy generates what appears to be an irresolvable 
riddle.19 If rape is defined as engaging in sex without consent, then it seems to 
logically follow that sex obtained by deception ought to be considered rape. Af-
ter all, deception invalidates consent in many legal contexts, both civil and 
criminal.20 Fraudulent consent deprives contracts of efficacy, transforms an 
otherwise lawful taking of property into criminal theft, and gives rise to tort lia-
bility for medical malpractice. Nevertheless, sex obtained by fraud does not 
usually amount to a crime under the vast majority of post-reform rape statutes 
and is not generally viewed as criminal in most contemporary accounts of 
rape.21 
Rubenfeld argues that contemporary rape scholars and reformers cannot 
argue that rape is a crime against sexual autonomy that ought to be defined as 
having sex without consent while simultaneously refusing to endorse broad 
criminalization of rape by fraud.22 If such scholars and reformers are truly 
committed to the idea of sexual autonomy, logic should compel them to punish 
all sex obtained by deception.23 If they refuse to do so—as many have done—
then they must abandon sexual autonomy as the linchpin of rape law.24 Either 
way, contemporary rape reformers and scholars are in a bind. Rubenfeld sug-
gests that the way out of the bind is by acknowledging that rape law is not truly 
about sexual autonomy. Instead, he argues that rape is a crime against the vic-
tim’s right to be in control of her own body.25 Given that people who agree to 
have sex because of fraudulent misrepresentations maintain control over their 
 
18. While defining rape as “sex without consent” may seem unremarkable to most 
people, rape has historically been defined in the United States as having forcible 
sexual intercourse rather than having nonconsensual sexual intercourse. As a re-
sult, non-forcible sex has historically not been considered rape even if the sex is 
nonconsensual. Id. 
19. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1395–98. 
20. In order to invalidate consent, the deception must be “material” according to 
whatever standard of materiality applies. For a detailed discussion of different 
standards of materiality, see infra Section III.B. 
21. See, e.g., B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraud or Impersonation, 91 A.L.R. 2d 
591 § 2 (1963) (“[T]he prevailing view is that upon proof that consent to inter-
course was given, even though [procured by fraud], a prosecution for rape cannot 
be maintained.”). 
22. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1380. 
23. Id. 
24. Id.  
25. Rubenfeld calls this right the right to “self-possession.” Id. at 1426. 
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bodies while they are having sex, Rubenfeld concludes that rape by fraud should 
not be criminalized.26 
In what follows, I will show that, while smart and imaginative, Rubenfeld’s 
account of rape law is wrong for two reasons. First, he fails to appreciate that 
consent and autonomy are scalar and multidimensional concepts that can be 
present to a greater or lesser degree. As a result, he is unable to perceive that the 
fact that rape law does not protect autonomy as much as other areas of law does 
not mean that rape law does not seek to enhance autonomy. Additionally, 
Rubenfeld misapprehends the nature of modern rape scholarship and reform, 
suggesting that the conceptual underpinnings of contemporary rape reform and 
scholarship commit them to the criminalization of rape by fraud when it really 
does not. The core of the modern rape reform movement had little to do with 
the informational dimension of consent, which is implicated in cases of rape-
by-deception. Instead, as I show in Part II, contemporary rape scholarship has 
primarily focused on the inherently coercive nature of sexual interactions in a 
male-dominated society. Once this comes into full view, there is little contradic-
tion between the commitment to sexual freedom displayed by rape reformers 
and scholars and their reticence to broadly criminalize rape by fraud. 
To better understand the challenges posed by the riddle of rape-by-
deception and to identify a solution, the remainder of this Part examines the 
kinds of autonomy and consent that lie at the heart of modern rape statutes. To 
do so, I first explain why autonomy is central to our understanding of contem-
porary sexual assault laws. I then flesh out the connection between the philo-
sophical concept of autonomy and the legal doctrine of consent. Finally, I dis-
tinguish autonomy from the related concept of freedom and point out that 
autonomy is both multidimensional and scalar. As I demonstrate in Parts II and 





26. Most of the responses to Rubenfeld’s article focus on arguing against his turn to 
self-possession without calling into question whether rape-by-deception actually 
presents a riddle. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, Sex, Lies and Law: Rethinking Rape-by-
Fraud, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON STATE POWER: CONSENT AND CONTROL 152, 166 
(Chris Ashford et al. eds., 2016); Dougherty, supra note 4; Patricia J. Falk, Not Log-
ic, but Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real World in Thinking About the 
Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. F. 353, 365 (2013) (“Rubenfeld is clearly cor-
rect when he observes that the cases of rape-by-fraud pose a riddle not susceptible 
of easy solution.”). 
While I also disagree with Rubenfeld’s view of rape as a crime against self-
possession, the challenge that I undertake in this Article is to show that once the 
notions of consent and autonomy that undergird modern rape law are under-
stood, rape-by-deception does not generate a riddle. Unlike previous responses, 
my critique thus goes to the core of Rubenfeld’s argument: if there is no real riddle 
of rape-by-deception there is no need to turn to self-possession.  
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B. The Importance of Autonomy and Consent to Contemporary Rape Law 
and to the Riddle of Rape-by-Deception 
 
Autonomy and consent are central to contemporary rape doctrine. Judicial 
and scholarly writings on modern rape law are rife with references to both con-
cepts. In an oft-cited case, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a definition 
of sexual assault that required proof of victim resistance because “such a regime 
would be inconsistent with modern principles of personal autonomy.”27 In-
stead, the court held, the only definition of rape that is compatible with respect 
for autonomy is one that requires “consent” to sex that is expressed in the form 
of an “affirmative and freely-given permission” to engage in intercourse.28 Sex-
ual autonomy and consent also lie at the core of many modern scholarly ac-
counts of rape law. Professor Stephen Schulhofer—one of the most influential 
contemporary rape law scholars and Chief Reporter of the Model Penal Code’s 
draft revised sexual assault statute—developed a conception of sexual assault 
that highlights “sexual autonomy as a distinctive constituent of personhood and 
freedom.”29 Once we view rape as an offense against sexual autonomy, Schulho-
fer argues, “intercourse without consent . . . would be unambiguously prohibit-
ed,” “even in the complete absence of force.”30 
Unsurprisingly, Rubenfeld’s formulation of the riddle of rape-by-deception 
also relies heavily on conceptions of autonomy and consent. Expressed in terms 
of autonomy, the challenge posed by the riddle is that contemporary rape re-
form’s refusal to broadly criminalize sex obtained by deception is incompatible 
with its commitment to sexual autonomy. In terms of consent, the riddle re-
veals an apparent tension between modern rape reform’s redefinition of rape as 
“sex without consent” and its failure to generally criminalize sex obtained by 
misrepresentations. More broadly, the riddle questions whether it is coherent to 
hold that engaging in sex without consent is wrong because it is a violation of 
autonomy while simultaneously holding that sex by deception should not be 
generally criminalized. 
Predictably, responses to the riddle of rape-by-deception also traffic heavily 
on particular—and sometimes idiosyncratic—conceptions of autonomy and 
consent. In her response to Rubenfeld, Professor Vera Bergelson concedes that 
obtaining sex by material deception is a violation of autonomy, but then sug-
gests that sometimes the violation is not significant enough to warrant the im-
position of punishment.31 But it is unclear if Bergelson can escape from the rid-
 
27. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992). 
28. Id. 
29. Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 35. The most recent revised draft of the Model Penal 
Code sexual assault provision is Section 213.0(3). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017). 
30. Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 72. 
31. Bergelson, supra note 26, at 169–70.  
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dle’s grip once she makes this concession. An obvious reply—and one that is 
frequently deployed by Rubenfeld—is that if theft law broadly criminalizes tak-
ings obtained by deception because such takings violate the property owner’s 
autonomy, shouldn’t rape law at least match this policy?32 This response is espe-
cially strong given that sexual autonomy is seen as at least as valuable—if not 
more valuable—than autonomy regarding property.33 As Professor Tom 
Dougherty notes, given that material misrepresentation “routinely vitiates con-
sent in cases involving larceny, trespass, and contract,” refusing to criminalize 
such misrepresentations in the sexual consent context seems “arbitrary and 
unmotivated.”34 
Professor Dougherty’s commitment to a certain conception of autonomy 
causes him to feel the rational pull of the riddle even more than Bergelson. Ac-
cording to Dougherty, “sex law [has] to pick its poison—to decide if it does or 
doesn’t stand for sexual autonomy” by either “embracing rape-by-deception or 
reconsidering . . . a right to sexual autonomy.”35 He then argues for the latter, 
claiming that “tak[ing] autonomy seriously” should lead to “adopt[ing] a more 
expansive conception of rape-by-deception,” even when doing so leads to “re-
luctantly accept[ing] that someone can be guilty of rape-by-deception by falsely 
saying he went to Yale.”36 Dougherty’s solution is logically sound but norma-
tively unattractive. In arguing that it is rape to obtain sex by lying about going 
to Yale, Dougherty cheapens the significance of rape without getting anything 
in return other than avoiding falling prey to the riddle of rape-by-deception. 
This is surely too steep a price to pay for escaping the grip of Rubenfeld’s argu-
ment. 
A certain conception of sexual autonomy is also at the core of Professor Pa-
tricia Falk’s response to the riddle of rape by fraud. Falk—the scholar who has 
devoted the most attention to the problem of rape-by-deception37—
acknowledges that “Rubenfeld is clearly correct when he observes that the cases 
of rape-by-fraud pose a riddle not susceptible of easy solution.”38 Falk suggests 
that “the riddle of rape-by-fraud cases should be unraveled by retaining sexual 
 
32. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1432–33. 
33.  One way of surmising that sexual autonomy is of more value than autonomy re-
garding property is by comparing the punishment of rape with the punishment of 
theft. All factors being equal, rape is punished considerably more harshly than 
theft. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF 
DESERT 362–67 (2013) (citing several studies that demonstrate that rape is punished 
more severely than theft). 
34. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 322. 
35. Id. at 334 (citing Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1379–80).  
36. Id. at 333–34.  
37. See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39 
(1998). 
38. Falk, supra note 26, at 365.  
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autonomy as the foundation of modern rape law, understanding the limits on 
the right of sexual autonomy, and developing a more robust understanding of 
which types of fraudulent (or deceptive) representations violate our right to 
sexual autonomy and which do not.”39 But it is unclear if Falk can non-
arbitrarily distinguish between deception that violates sexual autonomy and de-
ception that does not, especially given that she fails to provide a standard for 
coherently discriminating between deceptions that infringe autonomy and 
those that do not. 
Regardless of the different ways in which Bergelson, Dougherty, and Falk 
try to solve Rubenfeld’s puzzle, these scholars agree that there is something 
deeply problematic about our reluctance to broadly criminalize sex obtained by 
deception. Bergelson rejects Rubenfeld’s self-possession argument but she 
“completely share[s]” the concern that rape-by-deception poses serious line-
drawing problems if the violation of the victim’s sexual autonomy is the basis 
for punishing rape.40 Dougherty considers the riddle to be “fundamentally 
sound” and therefore “feel[s] the full force of Rubenfeld’s powerful argu-
ment.”41 Falk concedes that Rubenfeld is “clearly correct” to point out that the 
selective criminalization of rape-by-deception generates a riddle.42 These schol-
ars worry greatly that refusing to broadly punish sex obtained by deception is 
incompatible with both consent and autonomy. 
In the remainder of this Article, I show that this worry is misplaced because 
it is based on a faulty conception of how consent and autonomy work in differ-
ent domains of law and morality, and—as a result—of how these concepts ac-
tually operate in the context of rape law. In order to bear out this claim, this 
Part fleshes out the nature and scope of autonomy and consent both within and 
outside of sexual assault doctrine. The result will be a more nuanced view of 
consent and autonomy than the one that is generally presupposed by most rape 
scholars. It is a view that shows that—contrary to what Rubenfeld and others 
suggest—consent and autonomy can, and frequently do, coexist with certain 
kinds and degrees of deception. As I demonstrate in Parts III and IV, this will 
make it easier to appreciate that deception is not incompatible with the kind of 
autonomy and consent that modern rape statutes are designed to protect. 
 
C. The Connection Between Consent and Autonomy 
 
Consent is often described as an all-or-nothing proposition:43 either there is 
full consent or there is no consent at all. There is little conceptual breathing 
 
39. Id.  
40. Bergelson, supra note 26, at 166. 
41. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 331, 334.  
42. Falk, supra note 26, at 365. 
43. See, e.g., Adam Kolber, Smoothing Vague Laws, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 275, 286 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 
2016). 
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room in law for the notion of partial consent.44 If a person consents to someone 
else taking her property, the taking is lawful and, therefore, does not amount to 
theft.45 By the same token, if a person consents to sexual intercourse with an-
other person, the sex is lawful and, consequently, is not sexual assault or rape.46 
The same logic holds in the policing context, where a consented search is rea-
sonable and, as a result, lawful under the Fourth Amendment.47 There are, of 
course, circumstances in which consent is deemed legally ineffective. For exam-
ple, a mentally ill person’s consent to giving another his property is invalid.48 
Consent to sexual intercourse is not effective when given by a minor under the 
legal age of consent.49 A police search is unlawful if consent was obtained as a 
result of coercion.50 
Still, these circumstances serve to fully invalidate consent. If the relevant 
circumstances are present to the required degree, there is no consent at all. On 
the other hand, if the circumstances do not meet the relevant legal threshold for 
invalidating consent, then there is full consent. This is the case even if the cir-
cumstances come close to meeting the threshold but fall just short. If, for exam-
ple, the taking of property is consented to by a mentally ill person who is 
deemed to be just above the legal standard for competency, the taking does not 
amount to theft because it is fully consented to. Similarly, if the person who 
consents to sexual intercourse is one hour older than the legal age for consent, 
the conduct is fully consented to and does not constitute sexual assault. 
In contrast to the all-or-nothing nature of consent, the related concepts of 
autonomy and freedom are typically described as forming part of a continuum. 
It is common to talk about more or less autonomy and about increasing or di-
minishing freedom. All things being equal, it is sensible to say that a teenager’s 
choices are more autonomous than those of a toddler but less autonomous than 
 
44. It is possible for a party to consent to some act but not consent to some other re-
lated act. For example, a woman may consent to kissing but not to sexual inter-
course. While one could describe these cases as ones of partial consent, it is better 
to treat them as cases involving full consent to one thing (kissing) and a lack of 
consent to the other (sexual intercourse). To claim that the woman who consents 
to a kiss “partially” consents to intercourse is both descriptively false and norma-
tively unappealing. 
45.  See, e.g., State v. Maxon, 79 P.3d. 202, 209 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that theft is 
consummated when “control [is] exercised over property of another without the 
consent of the owner”).  
46. Vermont’s Penal Code, for example, defines sexual assault as engaging in a sexual 
act “without the consent of the other person.” VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (2017).  
47. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
48. See, e.g., ANNE E. MELLEY, MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE § 73 (2017) (explaining 
that mentally ill individuals are not competent to gift their property).  
49. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(3) (2017). 
50. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. 
SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION  
SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION  
 419 
those of an adult. We can also talk about convicts on probation having less 
freedom than non-convicted citizens but more freedom than imprisoned con-
victs. 
The all-or-nothing nature of consent is difficult to square with the scalar 
nature of autonomy and freedom. After all, consent is the currency with which 
the law cashes out expressions of autonomy and freedom. That is, consent is the 
tool that law most commonly deploys in order to operationalize conceptions of 
freedom and autonomy. If a person consents to a taking of her property, that is 
typically taken to mean that the person exercised her autonomy with regard to 
her property. Similarly, consent to sex generally implies that the person was free 
to not engage in sex. 
But if consent and autonomy are so intimately related, why is it that the law 
approaches consent in an all-or-nothing fashion while morality approaches au-
tonomy and freedom in a more scalar way? If autonomy and freedom lie on a 
spectrum, why does consent not also lie on a similar spectrum? 
The obvious answer is that the law often needs to adopt bright line rules in 
order to precisify vague moral standards. In the context of consent, courts and 
legislatures have pragmatic reasons for adopting an all-or-nothing conception 
of consent that serves as a rough proxy for the more scalar concepts of freedom 
and autonomy. As such, consent signals whatever minimum level of freedom 
and autonomy the legal system deems sufficient to legitimize a certain interac-
tion or exchange. 
However, there is more to the story than this. While the law largely refuses 
to describe consent as falling along a spectrum that goes from fully consensual 
to partially consensual to nonconsensual, consent is in fact defined in different 
ways depending on the context. In some contexts, such as medical malpractice 
law, consent is defined in a very robust way.51 In others—like consent to police 
searches in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—consent takes a weaker form.52 
In between these two extremes, consent is defined in weaker and stronger ways 
depending on the context and on the particular dimension of consent that the 
law focuses on. The end result is a varied and multifaceted approach to consent 
that belies what at first blush appears as a monolithic all-or-nothing view of 
consensuality. 
If the law wants to require that robust autonomy be exercised before an in-
teraction or exchange is deemed legally valid, it adopts a more stringent defini-
tion of consent. Medical malpractice is the paradigmatic example. If, on the 
 
51. Consent in the medical malpractice context requires that the patient be informed 
of all material risks inherent in treatment. See, e.g., Martin by Scoptur v. Richards, 
531 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Wis. 1995).  
52. Consent in the Fourth Amendment context needs to be uncoerced but does not 
need to be informed. See United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir. 
1976) (stating that “[the agent’s] stratagem in posing as a ‘helper’ to the Addresso-
graph-Multigraph representative who had been asked by defendants to help sell a 
portion of their press was legitimate police activity in pursuance of an investigative 
lead and not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment”). 
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other hand, the law wants to deem an interaction legally valid with only a min-
imal degree of autonomy being exercised, the law will adopt a weaker consent 
standard. This is the case with consent to police searches. The law’s more nu-
anced approach to consent is masked by the fact that the law uses the term 
“consent” in all of these varied contexts even though the term often means dif-
ferent things depending on the circumstances. 
In what follows, I explore in considerable detail the nature of autonomy 
and consent and the connection between them. What emerges is a kaleidoscop-
ic approach to consent that suggests that consent in law—much like the moral 
concepts of autonomy and freedom—lies on a continuum that ranges from 
quite robust to extremely weak varieties of consent. The idea of a spectrum of 
consent ranging from strong to weak packs a considerable explanatory punch, 
as it illuminates the chameleon-like nature of consent while simultaneously 
shedding light on the kinds of autonomy and freedom that lie at the heart of 
different legal doctrines. 
 
D. An Autonomy Primer 
 
Autonomy is defined in diverse ways by different scholars. As such, there is 
no universally agreed upon definition of the term. Nevertheless, there are cer-
tain features that lie at the core of most conceptions of autonomy. Perhaps the 
most central of these is the idea that to be autonomous is to be capable of “self-
rule” or of governing oneself. To govern oneself requires having the capacity to 
reflect and revise one’s identity and values.53 Under this approach, choices are 
autonomous when they reflect preferences, values, and identities that we have 
embraced as our own.54 This is essentially the view of philosopher Gerald 
Dworkin, who defines autonomy “as a second-order capacity of persons to re-
flect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth 
and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher order 
preferences and values.”55 
This conception of autonomy requires the existence of two capacities. First, 
an autonomous being must be capable of assessing and criticizing one’s prefer-
ences and desires. Second, autonomy requires the capacity to either accept one’s 
existing preferences or desires or to try to change or revise them so that they 
better reflect one’s higher order values. An example helps illustrate these two 
capacities. As I write these lines, I realize that I wish to eat sweets. I am not par-
ticularly thrilled by this realization, given that I am currently on a low carbohy-
drate diet. In light of my higher order commitment to healthy eating, I am cur-
 
53. See generally John Christman, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Self-Transformation, 27 
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 185 (2001).  
54. This is the view espoused by Harry G. Frankfurt in his seminal essay. See Harry G. 
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in THE IMPORTANCE OF 
WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11 (1988).  
55. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988). 
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rently doing my best to stave off the desire to consume sweets. Even more, I am 
trying to abandon my desire to eat sweets and substitute it with one that is more 
compatible with my commitment to a healthier lifestyle, such as eating nuts. 
This thought process is reflective of autonomy, since it displays both the capaci-
ty to critically assess my preferences and desires and the capacity to revise them 
in order to make them more compatible with higher order commitments. 
 
E. Autonomy and Freedom Distinguished 
 
While the terms “autonomy” and “freedom” are often used interchangea-
bly, many philosophers differentiate between them. The most common way of 
distinguishing the terms is by suggesting that autonomy is the capacity for self-
determination in accordance with one’s authentic or true values, whereas free-
dom (or liberty)56 is the ability of a person to act without significant external 
constraints. Freedom has been variously defined as “hav[ing] (significant) op-
tions that are not closed or made less eligible by the actions of other agents,”57 
as “freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barri-
er to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something,”58 and as “ab-
sence of interference.”59 Given that freedom is usually defined as the absence of 
significant external constraints on action, the typical forms of interference with 
freedom are the use of force and coercion.60 In contrast with freedom, autono-
my requires more than absence of coercion, since the concept is related to the 
more robust idea of “being a subject, of being more than a passive spectator of 
one’s desire’s and feelings.”61 In addition to our choices not being interfered 
with, autonomy requires that one be in charge of one’s values, desires, and pref-
erences. 
As defined here, freedom is typically a precondition for exercising our au-
tonomy.62 It is difficult to be moved into action by one’s freely chosen values 
and dispositions if one’s choices are significantly constrained by external fac-
tors, such as force or coercion. Therefore, “the typical ways of interfering with 
 
56. I use the terms “freedom” and “liberty” interchangeably. 
57. DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 14.  
58. Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314 
(1967). 
59. DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 107 (noting that liberty “is conceived either as mere 
absence of interference or as the presence of alternatives”).  
60. Id. at 14. 
61. Id. at 107.  
62. While it is arguable that freedom is a necessary condition for autonomy, some 
scholars have suggested that it is not. The paradigmatic example is that of Odys-
seus, who elects to have his freedom restricted when he faces the songs of the si-
rens. In that case, the restriction of freedom actually maximizes Odysseus’ auton-
omy. See id. at 106.  
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the liberty of an agent seem to also interfere with her autonomy.”63 In contrast, 
many interferences with autonomy do not also interfere with freedom. The par-
adigmatic example is that of deception. A person who chooses to act in a certain 
way because she was deceived has her autonomy undermined without having 
her freedom constrained in any significant way. Accordingly, Dworkin points 
out that “[d]eception is not a way of restricting liberty.”64 He gives the example 
of a “person who is put into a prison cell and told that all the doors are 
locked.”65 Since the doors are not really locked, this person is “free to leave the 
cell.”66 However, since “he cannot—given his information—avail himself of 
this opportunity, his ability to do what he wishes is limited.”67 This shows that 
“self-determination can be limited without limiting liberty.”68 That is, autono-
my can be undermined in ways that go beyond interferences with freedom. 
The distinction between freedom and autonomy is sometimes of consider-
able explanatory power. This is the case with rape law, where—as I will show in 
Parts II and III—the law is primarily designed to protect freedom rather than 
autonomy. 
 
F. The Multidimensional Nature of Autonomy 
 
Properly understood, autonomy can be measured along the dimensions of 
non-coercion, competency, and information. Regarding the first of these di-
mensions, since freedom is typically a condition for autonomy,69 an important 
feature of autonomous conduct is the absence of coercion. Coercion can take 
many forms, although it is usually associated with the use or threat of use of 
physical force against a person. Beyond this classic case, there are also psycho-
logical forms of coercion that range from hypnotism, to social conditioning, to 
the use of emotional and social isolation techniques. Coercion can also take 
economic form, such as when a person compels another to act by threatening to 
withdraw certain economic benefits or by terminating her employment.70 
In addition to the lack of external coercion, certain “competency” condi-
tions must be satisfied for conduct to be autonomous. As discussed in the pre-
vious section, these conditions include the capacity for exercising minimal ra-
 
63. Id. It is worth noting that Dworkin treats “freedom” and “liberty” as synonyms.  
64. Id. at 14.  
65. Id. at 105. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. at 14. 
68. Id. at 105.  
69. For the rare instance in which freedom may not be a condition for autonomy, see 
supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
70. For the definitive treatment of coercion, see generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, 
COERCION (1987). 
SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION  
SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION  
 423 
tionality and the absence of debilitating mental illness. The former is absent in 
very young children and develops slowly as we mature. Intoxication may induce 
a state in which minimal rationality is absent. Debilitating mental illness pre-
vents a person from behaving autonomously if it significantly impairs his ca-
pacity to behave rationally. These capacities combine to create what I call the 
“competency” dimension of autonomy. 
Conduct also needs to be sufficiently informed in order to qualify as auton-
omous. As Beauchamp and Childress point out, “[p]ersonal autonomy encom-
passes, at a minimum, self-rule that is free . . . from certain limitations such as 
an inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice.”71 This captures 
what I call the “informational” dimension of autonomy. Pursuant to this in-
formational dimension, an autonomous choice is one that is “fully informed.”72 
Thus, “[a]n action cannot be autonomous if the actor fails to have an under-
standing of his or her action.”73 The kind of understanding that is relevant to 
the informational dimension of autonomy is that which allows the person to 
“understand the nature and implications of his or her actions”74 and to appreci-
ate the “foreseeable consequences and possible outcomes that might follow as a 
result of performing and not performing the action.”75 
In combination with the non-coercion and competency conditions, this in-
formational component rounds out the three classic dimensions of autonomy. 
All three dimensions must be present to a certain degree in order for conduct to 
be considered autonomous.76 
 
G. The Scalar Nature of Autonomy 
 
In addition to being multidimensional, autonomy is scalar. That is, auton-
omy can be present in different degrees. Some actions may be considered more 
autonomous, while others may be considered less so. Autonomy, then, lies on a 
spectrum that ranges from full autonomy to complete lack of autonomy. In be-
tween these two extremes, there are multiple intermediate degrees of autonomy. 
Although there is scant reference to the scalar nature of autonomy in the 
literature, a handful of scholars have highlighted this feature. Ruth Faden and 
 
71. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58 
(5th ed. 2001).  
72. Onora O’Neill, The Inaugural Address: Autonomy: The Emperor’s New Clothes, 77 
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 1, 5 (2003).  
73.  RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 248 (1986). 
74. Id. at 250.  
75. Id. at 151.  
76. For a similar definition of autonomous action, see David Archard, Informed Con-
sent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 19, 21 (2008) (defining an 
autonomous act as one that is “informed, voluntary and rational”). 
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Tom Beauchamp, for example, argue that autonomy comes in degrees because 
some of the conditions that undergird it “may be placed on a broad continuum 
from fully present to wholly absent.”77 In order to better understand the scalar 
nature of autonomy, Faden and Beauchamp suggest beginning with a hypothet-
ical case of completely autonomous conduct.78 A fully autonomous action is 
conduct “that is fully understood and completely noncontrolled by the influ-
ences of others.”79 In these cases, “lack of understanding and control by others 
do not prevail in any degree.”80 The degree of autonomy exhibited by a certain 
choice wanes as we begin to strip away the understanding, control, and infor-
mation with which the action is performed.81 Eventually, the “pieces of the in-
terlocking machinery are eroded” so that “the resultant action increasingly be-
comes less autonomous” until “[w]ith sufficient stripping the behavior becomes 
nonautonomous.”82 
Faden and Beauchamp recognize that there will often be practical reasons 
that require identifying a particular cutoff point for autonomous action.83 This 
will frequently be the case in legal contexts, where courts must decide whether a 
particular interaction is sufficiently autonomous to be considered legally effica-
cious. In order to do so, it will be “necessary to establish thresholds above which 
all acts are treated as autonomous and below which all acts are treated as non-
autonomous.”84 This line drawing exercise will necessarily be “based on moral 
and policy considerations,” given that “no sharp line can be drawn purely on 
conceptual grounds to distinguish autonomous from nonautonomous ac-
tion.”85 
It is important to note that the fact that lines will often need to be drawn 
between autonomous and non-autonomous acts does not undermine either the 
conceptual claim that autonomy is a scalar notion nor the practical import of 
locating autonomy within a continuum. The scalar nature of autonomy is es-
sential to understanding why courts define consent in certain contexts differ-
ently than in others. Such disparities occur because courts draw the line be-
tween autonomy and non-autonomy at different points within the spectrum of 
autonomous action depending on the circumstances and the competing inter-
ests at stake in any given situation. 
 
77. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 73, at 238. More specifically, they argue that the 
condition of non-control and condition of understanding lie on spectrum. 
78. Id.  
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 238–39.  
81. Id.  
82. Id. at 239.  
83. See id. at 240. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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Not only is autonomy a scalar concept, but the specific components of au-
tonomy are scalar as well. Therefore, the three dimensions of autonomy that I 
have identified are capable of manifesting themselves in a more or less robust 
fashion. 
Like autonomy itself, the non-coercive dimension of autonomy comes in 
degrees. Choices can be more or less coerced depending on the circumstances of 
the case. As Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explains, “the degree of coercion varies 
with the amount of harm that is threatened as well as the probability of escap-
ing harm if you don’t comply with the demand.”86 Given that coercion is scalar 
and that it is a dimension of autonomy, the degree of autonomy exhibited by an 
action will vary depending on the amount of coercion that is present in the case. 
As Faden and Beauchamp indicate, “[t]he form of control exerted by the influ-
ence attempts of others also affects the degree to which an action is autono-
mous.”87 If “there are degrees of threats and degrees of abilities to resist 
threats,” then it must be “that some threats render actions more nonautono-
mous than others.”88 
The competency dimension of autonomy is also a matter of degrees. That 
is, a person may be more or less competent to exercise meaningful autonomy in 
different circumstances. As Faden and Beauchamp point out, “[p]ersons may 
be judged more or less competent to the extent they possess a certain level of 
ability or number of abilities.”89 As an illustration of this notion, they suggest 
that “an experienced surgeon is likely to be more competent to consent to sur-
gery than a frightened young soldier.”90 What emerges is a “continuum of 
competence” that ranges “without discernible breaks from full competence 
through various levels of partial competence to full incompetence.”91 
Finally, the informational dimension of autonomy is also scalar. Depending 
on the amount of information available, a choice will range from fully informed 
to completely uninformed. The degree of autonomy that obtains in any given 
situation is directly proportional to the amount of information that the agent 
has prior to acting.92 As the quantity and quality of the information in posses-
 
86. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Free Contrastivism, in CONTRASTIVISM IN PHILOSOPHY 
134, 148 (Martijn Blaauw ed., 2013).  
87. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 73, at 239.  
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 289.  
90. Id.  
91. Id. 
92. The degrees of informational autonomy have been well documented in the medi-
cal context, where it has been pointed out that “patient competence to understand 
and participate in medical decision making comes in a spectrum, from the essen-
tially nonexistent to the marginal to the well-informed and reflective.” STEPHEN 
WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT AUTONOMY AND CLINICIAN BENEFICENCE 
WITHIN HEALTH CARE 82 (2d ed. 1998). Depending on the risks inherent in treat-
ment and on the potential of confusion that may be generated by providing addi-
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sion of the agent diminishes, the degree of autonomy that can be exhibited de-
creases as well. In contrast, “the more information a person understands, the 
more enhanced are the possibilities for autonomy of action.”93 
 
H. From Autonomy to Consent 
 
Consent is the vehicle through which legal actors translate concerns about 
autonomy into legally workable standards and rules. As a result, courts and leg-
islatures interested in enhancing autonomy will frequently require that the rele-
vant interaction be consensual in order for it to be legally efficacious.94 Consent 
is essential for deciding issues that are as varied as the validity of a contract, the 
rules governing medical malpractice, the takings of property that amount to 
theft, and the kinds of sexual intercourse that give rise to liability for sexual as-
sault. 
Given the strong link between consent and autonomy, one would expect 
that consent—like autonomy—be multidimensional. This seems to be the case, 
since coercion, competency, and information are all relevant to consent. That 
coercion is relevant to consent is confirmed by the fact that coerced consent is 
invalid in essentially every legally relevant context ranging from contracts to 
rape law. Competency is also clearly part of the legal landscape of consent. Cer-
tain people are not competent to enter into contracts, engage in sexual inter-
course, or consent to medical treatment. Finally, courts and legislatures fre-
quently make reference to consent’s informational dimension. The most 
obvious context is in medical malpractice, where courts often point out that pa-
tient consent must be adequately informed in order for medical treatment to be 
lawful. Since consent can be assessed along the same three dimensions that 
comprise autonomous conduct, there is little doubt about its multidimensional 
nature. 
Contrary to what may appear at first glance, consent—much like autono-
my—exists along a spectrum. Consent can thus range from very robust to quite 
weak. Consent in a certain case can be more or less coerced, competent, or in-
formed than consent in a different case. If one focuses on the informational di-
mension of consent, for example, one can see that consent to medical treatment 
is more robust along this dimension than consent to sex, even if it is equally ro-
bust with regard to the remaining two dimensions.95 
 
tional information, “a patient’s place within this spectrum will be more or less ac-
ceptable.” Id.  
93. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 73, at 239. 
94. See sources cited supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
95. In any given case, the factfinder must find consent to either exist or not exist, ac-
cording to the applicable legal standard. In this narrow sense, consent is all-or-
nothing rather than scalar. Nevertheless, consent is scalar in the broader sense that 
the legal standards of consent range from quite robust in certain contexts (e.g., 
medical malpractice) to quite weak in other contexts (e.g., consensual police 
searches). It is the latter kind of scalarity that is relevant for tackling Rubenfeld’s 
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It is also possible for a certain kind of consent to be more robust along one 
dimension while simultaneously less robust along another dimension than 
some other kind of consent. This is the case with the kinds of consent required 
by the criminal offenses of theft and sexual assault. Consent in the law of rape is 
more robust than consent in the law of theft along the non-coercive dimension, 
but less robust across the informational dimension. Regarding the non-coercive 
dimension, modern sexual assault law often invalidates consent when it takes 
place in the context of an inherently coercive circumstance. Coercion is deemed 
inherent in the context of certain relationships, such as foster parent and foster 
child, mental health therapist and patient, and teacher and student.96 Assessing 
the coercion inherent in a sexual relationship between a high school teacher and 
one of his students, a court affirmed a sexual assault conviction stating: “[i]n 
light of the disparity of power inherent in the teacher-student relationship, we 
conclude that both victims were situated in an inherently coercive relationship 
with the defendant wherein consent might not easily be refused.”97 Referencing 
the inherent coercion that exists between a superior and a subordinate, a federal 
court held that “the nature of the relationship between [a lieutenant colonel] 
and [a private first class] . . . is such that consent might not easily be refused.”98 
Courts have made similar statements regarding the coercion inherent in rela-
tionships between clergy and their followers99 and between correctional staff 
and the inmates under their supervision.100 
In many states it is also deemed inherently coercive for a minor who is oth-
erwise capable of consent to have sex with someone who is older than her by a 
certain amount of years. In Alaska, for example, it is a crime for someone who 
is 16 years of age or older to have sex with someone who is under 13 years of 
age.101 More specifically, the statute contemplates that minors between 13 and 16 
 
“riddle of rape-by-deception.” Rubenfeld claims that it is puzzling that deception 
negates consent in theft law but not in rape law. As I will show in Part III, infra, 
this claim is mistaken because consent is scalar in the sense that consent in certain 
legal contexts demands more information, a lack of coercion, or competency than 
in other contexts. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1432–33. 
 For a view that is sympathetic to the idea that consent is scalar, see Kolber, 
supra note 43, at 266–88. While Kolber seems to believe that it is plausible to think 
about consent as lying along a continuum, he does not do so by engaging in a mul-
tidimensional analysis of consent, as set forth in this Article.  
96. An example of such statutes is Georgia’s sexual assault law, which criminalizes sex 
between a person who has supervisory or disciplinary authority and the individual 
over whom she has authority. GA. CODE § 16-6-5.1 (2017). 
97. State v. McKenzie-Adams, 915 A.2d 822, 836 (Conn. 2007), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Payne, 34 A.3d 370 (Conn. 2012).  
98. Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 519 (2005). 
99. Talbert v. State, 239 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Ark. 2006). 
100. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2003).  
101. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (2017). 
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years of age may consent to sex with someone under 16 years of age, but may 
not consent to sex with someone older than 16. While there are some minors 
whom the law assumes are simply incompetent to consent to sex, minors over a 
certain age are competent in many states to consent to sex, as long as the part-
ner is not considerably older than the minor.102 The consent obtained in these 
cases is considered inherently coerced because “[a]lthough exploitation and co-
ercion can occur in any sexual encounter involving a minor, the most obviously 
exploitative situations involve a large age difference or a position of trust be-
tween the minor and the other participant.”103 In these situations, the older par-
ticipant “is often viewed as a predator who specifically sought out an underage 
partner because of the power disparity.” 104 The rationale undergirding the in-
validation of consent in these cases is that “when an adult engages in sexual ac-
tivity with a minor, we assume that the minor’s decision to engage in that ac-
tivity was the result of pressure, if not coercion, by the adult.”105 
Modern rape statutes protect the non-coercive dimension of autonomy 
considerably more than common law-based rape statutes. At common law, co-
ercion would negate consent only if it was the product of considerable physical 
force.106 As a result, non-physical threats would not give rise to rape liability at 
common law. In one case, a high school principal told a student that she would 
not be allowed to graduate unless she performed oral sex on him.107 The student 
yielded to the threat and had oral sex with the principal. The court held that the 
principal’s conduct was not criminal because only physical threats may give rise 
to liability at common law.108 Under more modern rape statutes, however, these 
kinds of threats are considered inherently coercive and thus give rise to liability 
for sexual assault.109 
In contrast, consent to a taking of property is typically valid under the law 
of theft even when it takes place in the context of situations that the modern law 
of rape describes as inherently coercive. As a result, contemporary law protects 
the non-coercive dimension of autonomy more in the context of rape than in 
the context of theft. It is useful to illustrate this concept with several examples. 
A mental health therapist may lawfully sell goods to his patients. A student may 
 
102. Id. 
103. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of 
Substantive Law, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5, 18 (2013). 
104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. See, e.g., Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872). 
107. State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State 
v. Spreadbury, 257 P.3d 392 (Mont. 2011). 
108. Id. 
109. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 16-6-5.1 (2017) (criminalizing sex between teachers and stu-
dents in Georgia). 
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lawfully allow a teacher to borrow her vehicle. A fifteen-year-old can lawfully 
give personal property as a gift to her twenty-one-year-old boyfriend. The 
property exchanges in all of these cases are treated as consensual under the law 
of theft in circumstances in which sex between the same parties would be con-
sidered nonconsensual. This shows that the kind of consent required by mod-
ern rape laws is more robust along the non-coercive dimension than the type of 
consent that undergirds the law of theft. 
Yet, consent in theft law is more robust than consent in rape law along the 
informational dimension. While neither consent to sex in rape statutes nor con-
sent to takings of property in theft laws typically require that certain disclosures 
be made prior to the act in order for consent to be efficacious, theft law general-
ly criminalizes obtaining property by fraud whereas sexual assault law does not 
often prohibit sex obtained by deception. More specifically, the law of theft 
broadly criminalizes lying in order to obtain property,110 whereas the law of rape 
only punishes sex obtained by lying in certain cases, such as when the defendant 
impersonates the victim’s spouse or when the deception prevents the victim 
from understanding the nature of the act.111 
 
I. Autonomy and Consent: Summary 
 
So far, I have demonstrated that autonomy and consent are both scalar and 
multidimensional. I also distinguished between freedom and autonomy. Free-
dom is defined primarily by reference to the non-coercive dimension of auton-
omy. A choice is free when it is not coerced by internal or external forces. In 
contrast, autonomy requires not only freedom from coercion, but also a certain 
degree of competency and a given amount of information. In what follows, I 
will explain how the distinction between freedom and autonomy and an under-
standing of the multidimensional and scalar nature of autonomy and consent 
allow us to better grasp the fundamental commitments of modern rape reform-
ers (Part II) and to find a way out of Rubenfeld’s riddle of rape-by-deception 
(Part III). 
 
II. Consent and Autonomy in Modern Rape Reform 
 
Equipped with a better understanding of the scalar and multidimensional 
nature of consent and autonomy, I will now survey the scholarly literature on 
rape to identify the conceptions of consent and autonomy that undergird mod-
ern attempts to reform rape law. The analysis will show that the feminist rape 
reform movement was primarily about securing additional freedom from coer-
cion in the context of sexual relations. It will also reveal that the conceptions of 
consent and autonomy that emerge from the modern rape reform movement 
 
110. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
111. For a more extensive discussion of the cases in which sex by deception is, or 
should be, punished by rape law, see infra Section IV.D.  
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are ones that considerably strengthen the non-coercive dimension of consent 
and autonomy while leaving the competency and informational dimensions 
largely untouched. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that contemporary 
rape statutes do not broadly criminalize sex obtained by deception. 
 
A. Rape as Individualized and Institutionalized Coercion 
 
Sustained scholarly attention to rape in the literature began with the writ-
ings of many second-wave feminists of the 1970s.112 The main thrust of these 
writings was to conceive of rape as a crime of violence rather than a crime of 
passion or desire. The view is said to originate with Susan Brownmiller’s asser-
tion that “rape is a crime not of lust, but of violence and power.”113 Similarly, 
Susan Rae Peterson stated: “rape is first and foremost a crime of violence 
against the body.”114 According to this view, “rape has nothing to do with sexual 
passion; it is an act of power, anger, or hatred.”115 Rape thus becomes “an as-
saultive crime that attacks the physical integrity and mind of the victim.”116 
These scholars also viewed rape as a tool used by males to exercise power over 
women in order to coerce them into behaving in ways that males found desira-
ble. 
Another important strand in this literature was the view that rape benefits 
not only the actual rapist, but also all males.117 All men benefit from rape be-
cause the crime is part of “a conscious process of intimidation by which all men 
keep all women in a state of fear.”118 Accordingly, Carolyn Shafer and Marilyn 
Frye observe that “[w]omen in this society live generally under the threat of 
 
112. MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA: FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS OF 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 48–60 (2000). 
113. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15 (1986).  
114. Susan Rae Peterson, Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket, in 
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 360, 364 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds., 1977). 
115. Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 156 (1992). 
116. Id. 
117. I acknowledge that many modern rape statutes do not limit rape liability to male 
on female assault, but rather criminalize sexual assault regardless of gender. Nev-
ertheless, the evolution of rape law has been strongly influenced by gendered fac-
tors and relationships. See, e.g., SUSAN J. BRISON, AFTERMATH: VIOLENCE AND THE 
REMAKING OF A SELF 98 (2002) (describing rape as “gender-motivated violence 
against women, which is perpetrated against women collectively, albeit not all at 
once and in the same place”). Given that this Part aims to elucidate the fundamen-
tal philosophical commitments that undergirded the feminist rape reform move-
ment and that this movement has, in fact, focused on such gendered factors and 
relationships, the discussion proceeds based on that assumption. The aim of this 
Part is thus to describe the views that inspired the modern rape reform movement 
rather than to normatively justify them. 
118. BROWNMILLER, supra note 113, at 15. 
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rape.”119 This threat “limits the movements of women about their communities, 
restricts their access to various services and amusements,” and “restricts their 
pursuit both of comfort and of self-expression in their clothes and personal 
styles.”120 Men take advantage of this fear by offering women protection from 
the threat of rape in exchange for sex and other benefits, such as love, monog-
amy, and motherhood. As one feminist scholar puts it, “the practice of rape ef-
fectively keeps women in their places; indeed, because many women fear being 
raped, they remain much more stationary and sedentary than men.”121 
Rape is thus seen not only as an individualized crime that wrongs a specific 
victim, but also as a broader societal practice that our patriarchal society uses to 
coerce women into behaving in ways that males find appropriate.122 The con-
ception that emerges is that of rape as something that is “not primarily [under-
stood] as a specific, singular crime, but rather as the most blatant example of 
systematic misogyny and masculine dominance.”123 
The concept of consent that results from the view of rape as a crime of 
domination and subjugation is one that is directly tied to the presence or ab-
sence of violence or coercion. Rape is nonconsensual, violent, and coerced sex. 
Sex that is not rape is consensual, non-violent, and uncoerced. Thus, rape is de-
fined as a case in which a “woman does not consent [to sex], or consents by co-
ercion.”124 Given the view of these scholars that rape is primarily a crime of vio-
lence, it is not surprising that the chief concern that underpins this literature is 
that of coercion. Because of its violence, frequency, and threat of victimization, 
rape generates a considerable amount of inherent social coercion that results in 
significant curtailment of female liberty.125 Hence, the “rape as violence” view 
suggests that “what is wrong with rape is primarily its restriction of the freedom 
of bodily movement for women.”126 
The feminist scholars who advocate this approach adopt a broad definition 
of coercion and, therefore, of violence. While physical force and threats are co-
ercive, so too are non-physical pressures that generate an inherently coercive 
environment in which any consent obtained is suspect. Much like sex obtained 
by physical force, sex obtained by the use of non-physical types of coercion is 
incompatible with consent and, therefore, amounts to rape. According to one 
respected scholar’s view: 
 
 
119. Carolyn M. Shafer & Marilyn Frye, Rape and Respect, in FEMINISM AND 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 114, at 333, 342. 
120. Id. at 342–43.  
121. Peterson, supra note 114, at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122. Id. at 364. 
123. ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 15 (2001). 
124. Peterson, supra note 114, at 366. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 360.  
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The women’s folklore of rape—cases that seldom, if ever, reach a court 
of law—is an oral history of abuses by men in positions of authority. 
The therapist who applies his personal kind of sexual theory, the doctor 
or dentist who suddenly turns a routine examination into a physical 
overture that the bewildered patient feels helpless to halt, the producer 
who preys on a starlet’s ambition, the professor who twists to his ad-
vantage his student’s interest in his field of scholarship—these are ex-
amples of what men would call seduction since the sexual goal may be 
accomplished without the use, or even the threat, of physical force, but 
the imposition of sex by an authority figure is hardly consensual or 
“equal.”127 
 
There are two features of this view that I wish to highlight for the purposes 
of this Article. First, the feminist scholars who advance the view of rape as vio-
lence are primarily interested in showing that (1) rape is coercive and violent at 
an individual and institutional level, and (2) that the coercion is exercised by 
males upon females directly and indirectly, overtly and subtly, and physically 
and non-physically. This view of coercion is considerably broader than the view 
of coercion that is presupposed by the common law of rape. The common law 
of rape required that the perpetrator use or threaten to use physical force and 
that the victim physically resist.128 In contrast, the feminists who argued that 
rape was violence adopted a considerably more robust definition of coercion 
that did not require physical threats or resistance. Pursuant to this account of 
rape, coercion “can take many forms,” including “economic and emotional co-
ercion.”129 
Second, these scholars focused the vast majority of their energy on critically 
assessing the non-coercive dimension of consent. That is, their project was pri-
marily geared towards analyzing the kinds of overt and subtle forms of coercion 
that rendered sex nonconsensual. More broadly, this feminist literature con-
ceived of rape as a crime against women’s freedom of movement. Because of the 
incessant fear of being raped, women do not feel free to do as they please and 
are therefore indirectly coerced to turn to men for protection and to abide by 
male-dominated rules regarding expected sexual behavior. Thus, these scholars 
were primarily concerned with freedom rather than autonomy. 
As I explained in Part I, although many people use the terms “freedom” 
and “autonomy” interchangeably, philosophers often distinguish between the 
two.130 A common way of doing so is by defining freedom as the absence of ex-
ternal constraints, while defining autonomy as the capacity to critically accept 
 
127. BROWNMILLER, supra note 113, at 271.  
128. See, e.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev’d, 424 A.2d 720 
(Md. 1981).  
129. BROWNMILLER, supra note 113, at 271. 
130. See supra Section I.D. 
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or revise the values, desires, and beliefs that ground the choices we make.131 So 
defined, freedom is primarily about the non-coercive dimension of autonomy 
and consent. To be free in this sense is to be unconstrained by coercion and 
other kinds of pressures. Freedom, then, is not about having sufficient infor-
mation to make an informed choice. Instead, it is about not being physically or 
psychologically pressured by others into doing what you do not desire to do. 
This is precisely the kind of consent that lies at the core of the rape as violence 
literature. This is not to say that these scholars did not address the information-
al dimension of consent or that they did not care about the broader notion of 
autonomy; they were surely concerned about cases of uninformed or misin-
formed sex and frowned upon the use of deception to obtain sexual intercourse. 
Nevertheless, this was not their primary focus. This feminist movement was 
about domination, subjugation, and violence against women. As such, it fo-
cused primarily on coercion rather than on information and deception. 
 
B. The Elusiveness of Consensual Sex in a Patriarchal Society 
 
The rape-as-violence view distinguished between sex that was rape and sex 
that was not rape and, consequently, between sex without consent (rape) and 
consensual sex (non-rape). In contrast, a more radical feminist view argued that 
the distinction between sex that is violent and non-violent or consensual or 
nonconsensual is too elusive to ground a robust feminist theory of rape. These 
more radical scholars argued that it is difficult to distinguish between rape and 
non-rape in a male-dominated society. To be clear, these scholars did not argue 
that all sex is rape, as many have incorrectly suggested.132 They argue instead 
that the boundaries between (bad) rape and (good) sex are so blurred in our 
patriarchal society that it is hard to make sense of the distinction. Thus, these 
scholars are skeptical of theories that presuppose that “rape is definable as dis-
tinct from intercourse,” given that rape and intercourse are difficult for women 
“to distinguish . . . under conditions of male dominance.”133 
In criticizing the rape-as-violence literature, Professor Catharine MacKin-
non states that although the approach “gave needed emphasis to rape’s previ-
ously effaced elements of power and dominance, it obscured its elements of 
 
131. Id. 
132. The claim that Professor Catharine MacKinnon asserted that “all sex is rape” can 
be traced back to DAPHNE PATAI & NORETTA KOERTGE, PROFESSING FEMINISM: 
CAUTIONARY TALES FROM INSIDE THE STRANGE WORLD OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 129 
(1994) (claiming that “Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon have long ar-
gued that in a patriarchal society all heterosexual intercourse is rape”). For docu-
mentation on the origins of this mistaken claim, see Cindy Richards, Fighting a Lie 
that Just Won’t Die, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/  
1999-05-30/news/9906030177_1_sexual-harassment-databases-journalism-ethics 
[http://perma.cc/Z2K6-LN79]. 
133. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983). 
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sex.”134 Relatedly, MacKinnon rejects the rape-as-violence view because “to say 
rape is violence not sex preserves the ‘sex is good’ norm by simply distinguish-
ing forced sex as ‘not sex.’”135 This has the effect of perpetuating patriarchal 
norms regarding appropriate sexual behavior because it allows males to claim 
that non-violent and consensual sex is acceptable when such distinctions are 
notoriously difficult to make in a patriarchal society that defines men as domi-
nant and females as passive. 
According to this more radical view, male use of force to obtain sex is “ro-
manticized” and “naturalized.”136 There is a sense, then, in which force is sex 
and sex is force under conditions of male dominance.137 The force that accom-
panies sex in a patriarchal society ranges from subtle pressures such as “gender 
socialization” and the “withholding of benefits” to harsher pressures such as 
physical force.138 Accordingly, sexuality in contemporary society amounts to “a 
social sphere of male power to which forced sex is paradigmatic.”139 This, in 
turn, generates a view in which “coercion [is] integral to male sexuality.”140 
What is wrong, then, with sex in a male-dominated society is that it takes place 
under inherently coercive circumstances. This makes it difficult to distinguish 
between coerced sex that is traditionally viewed as rape and uncoerced sex that 
is typically believed to be acceptable. MacKinnon then argues that the distinc-
tion between rape and sex is so blurred, that instead of asking “what is the viola-
tion of rape?” one should instead ask “what is the nonviolation of inter-
course?”141 When the social conditions under which the sex is obtained are 
imbued with coercion, the distinction between forcible intercourse that 
amounts to rape and non-forcible sex breaks down. 
Since this more radical view assumes that sex is inherently coercive, it is not 
surprising that consent plays little role in distinguishing unacceptable rape from 
acceptable intercourse. If the problem with sex in a male-dominated society is 
that it is inherently coercive, then consenting to sex does not solve the problem, 
for consent takes place under the same inherently coercive circumstances. As 
such, distinguishing between truly consensual acts and nonconsensual acts in a 
patriarchal social order is as elusive as distinguishing between (bad) rape and 
(good) sex. 
 
134. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: “Pleasure Under 
Patriarchy,” 99 ETHICS 314, 323 (1989). 
135. Id.  
136. Id. at 325. 
137. Id.  
138. Id.  
139. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 173 (1989).  
140 Id.  
141. Id. at 174. 
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Under this view, rape is “an act of subordination of women to men” that 
“expresses and reinforces women’s inequality to men” rather than nonconsen-
sual sex that violates a woman’s autonomy.142 Therefore, instead of asking 
whether sex was consensual, one ought to ask “whether consent is a meaningful 
concept.”143 It seems clear to these radical scholars that it is not. Given that con-
sent is insufficient to neutralize coercion in a male-dominated society, these 
scholars argue in favor of abandoning the notion of consent. They claim that 
the law needs to move beyond consent in order to neutralize this inherent coer-
cion. As a result, several feminist scholars have attempted to come up with an 
alternative concept that better distinguishes between appropriate and inappro-
priate sexual relations. For these scholars—as for those discussed in the previ-
ous section—the chief problem that rape law needed to address was the inher-
ent coercion of sex in a male-dominated society. As such, these scholars were 
more concerned with neutralizing inherent power imbalances than with secur-
ing autonomous consent. 
One prominent approach to developing such an alternative conceptualiza-
tion is that put forth by Lois Pineau in her influential article Date Rape: A Femi-
nist Analysis.144 She suggests that appropriate sexual intercourse is “communica-
tive” rather than consensual.145 The kind of communicative sexuality that 
Pineau references is one that is premised on the idea of “mutuality of desire.”146 
Sex anchored in mutuality takes place when “each person’s interest in continu-
ing is contingent upon the other person wishing to do so too, and each person’s 
interest is as much fueled by the other’s interest as it is by her own.”147 By re-
quiring that people communicate before having sex and that they seek to do on-
ly that which the other party communicates that she wants, Pineau seeks to 
eradicate “manipulative, coercive, and exploitive behaviour.”148 Under this 
model, coercive sex is thus defined as “noncommunicative” rather than non-
consensual.149 
Another feminist account that purports to transcend consent as the vehicle 
for distinguishing rape from permissible sex is Professor Lynne Henderson’s. 
Henderson offers multiple frameworks through which we could interpret rape, 
one of which is critical of the prevailing conception of consent: “‘consensual’ in 
a thin sense of the word ‘consent’ that fails to take into account women’s sub-
ordinated status and assumes that women have equal power to act autono-
 
142. Id. at 182.  
143. MacKinnon, supra note 133, at 650. 
144. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989). 
145. Id. at 236. 
146. Id. 
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mously in sexual relations.”150 Consent—at least as traditionally construed both 
in law and society—“protect[s] an irrational and irresponsible model of male 
sexuality, courting behavior, and female sexuality, giving women little access to 
law in protecting themselves against male sexual aggression.”151 In particular, 
Henderson points out that current approaches to rape often lead to cases in 
which consent can easily be obtained even when there is violence.152 Given this 
state of affairs, she proposes that we move to a model based on taking responsi-
bility for and communicating about our sexuality.153 This approach seeks to en-
sure that both man and woman are “interested” and “willing” to have sex and 
“communicating” with each other about what they want and do not want to 
do.154 The goal is to encourage “[e]xploration of each other’s pleasure and de-
sire in a context of empathy, communication, and care.”155 
Professor Martha Chamallas advanced another influential model of rape 
that was not primarily based on consent. Her goal was to develop an “approach 
to regulation designed to limit sexual coercion in amorous relationships, with-
out eliminating sexual freedom.”156 To do so, Chamallas develops an “egalitari-
an” view of sexuality that—like Pineau’s—is closely linked to the idea of mutu-
ality. Borrowing heavily from sexual harassment doctrine, her model asks 
“whether the more passive target of sexual overtures actually welcomed the ini-
tiative.”157 In order to decide if the sexual initiative was welcome, we try to de-
termine “whether the target would have initiated the encounter if she had been 
given the choice.”158 If we answer affirmatively, “there is some assurance of mu-
tuality in the sexual encounter” and, therefore, there are good reasons for label-
ing the resulting sexual act as lawful.159 If, however, we answer negatively, then 
we ought to be skeptical of mutuality and, consequently, have reason to consid-
er the resulting sexual act to be unlawful.160 This egalitarian view is geared to-
wards maximizing choices made in circumstances of relative equality between 
the parties. If the male has more power than the female, then the choice to en-
gage in sexual intercourse is suspect, even if no obvious force or coercion was 
 
150. Henderson, supra note 115, at 143.  
151. Id. at 151.  
152. Id.  
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156. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. 
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used to obtain sex. Chamallas thus concludes that the most egalitarian and mu-
tual kind of sex is that which seeks intimacy or pleasure. On the contrary, “sex-
ual encounters in which money, power, prestige, or financial or physical securi-
ty is traded for sexual pleasure or intimacy” are at odds with the egalitarian 
model.161 While it is true that in these encounters “each party might be said to 
have gained something,” they fail to comport to the egalitarian ideal since “they 
are not premised on mutuality because the gains of each are so different in 
character.”162 
While there are subtle variations amongst the proposals put forth by 
Pineau, Henderson, and Chamallas, they share two features. First, they all take 
as their point of departure that consent is not the best way to distinguish be-
tween appropriate and inappropriate sexual intercourse. Second, all of these 
models are primarily designed to counteract the inherently coercive environ-
ment in which consent to sexual relations is typically obtained under conditions 
of male dominance. 
An example that demonstrates the failures of the traditional consent model 
is date rape. Date rape occurs when a person is raped by someone she knows.163 
The perpetrator is typically someone the victim has dated or is otherwise ro-
mantically involved with. The challenge that date rape presents for current rape 
law is that in many, if not most, date rape cases consent is not obtained by ob-
vious use of coercion. In many instances the woman passively submits to a 
man’s sexual advances after initially expressing reservations about having inter-
course.164 In other cases, the woman may verbally say “no” but the male claims 
to have construed her non-verbal cues as indicating consent in spite of the ver-
bal refusal.165 The traditional consent model fails in many of these instances be-
cause courts often infer consent when a woman submits to a man’s repeated 
sexual advances even if the woman initially hesitated. Similarly, courts often in-
fer consent from non-verbal cues such as kissing and other acts of foreplay, and 
they sometimes do so even when the woman verbally expresses that she does 
not wish to have sexual intercourse. 
From a feminist perspective, these cases are problematic not only because it 
is unclear whether they are consensual or not, but also—and more important-
ly—because the sexual intercourse takes place under conditions of unequal 
power that make it difficult for the woman to meaningfully consent to inter-
course. The power imbalance between men and women creates inherently coer-
cive circumstances in much the same way that inherently coercive circumstanc-
 
161. Id. at 840–41. 
162. Id. at 841. 
163. See JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD 
CRIME 61 (1993). 
164. See, e.g., State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).  
165. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). 
SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 35 : 407 2017 
438 
es are created by the imbalance of power that exists between employers and 
employees, doctors and patients, and ministers and parishioners. As a result, the 
problem with consent, as Janet Halley recently pointed out, is that “much of the 
sex women have with men is consented to under coercive circumstances—
subjectively consented to by women who nevertheless find the sex to be un-
wanted.”166  
In order to neutralize the coercion that is inherent in this power imbalance, 
these scholars propose that males communicate with females about whether 
they desire to have sex rather than merely inferring consent. As a result, much 
like the literature previously discussed, the scholarship that advocates for alter-
natives to consent is primarily driven by a desire to neutralize coercion rather 
than to make sure that sex takes place only when both parties are informed of 
material facts. 
It is once again illustrative to think about why date rape cases are of such 
importance to this literature. The problem with date rape is not typically that 
the parties do not have full information about what is about to take place. The 
issue in these cases is inherent coercion, not lack of knowledge. More specifical-
ly, we worry that only token consent was obtained because it is difficult to fully 
credit female consent to male sexual advances when existing social norms en-
courage male aggression and female passivity. 
It is not that these scholars did not object to using deception to obtain sex. 
They surely did. However, they did not identify this as the chief evil of sex ob-
tained in conditions of male dominance. There is something more pernicious 
and more fundamental about sex in a patriarchal society than its simply being 
misinformed. A male-dominated social order does not need misinformation in 
order to make women submit to sex. Given the coercion inherent in this kind of 
social arrangement, women regularly give in to men’s aggressive sexual pro-
posals even when they are informed of all relevant facts. 
Therefore, the radical feminist movement regarding rape is best seen as one 
that intended to maximize women’s freedom to engage in sexual intercourse. 
Once again, the “freedom” that I have in mind is not one that is coextensive 
with autonomy. Rather, it is freedom in the technical sense of “unconstrained 
choice.” In the context of the radical feminist movement regarding rape, to be 
free is to engage in sex without being coerced to do so, either by overt physical 
force or by the subtler pressures that permeate sexual encounters that occur 
under conditions of male dominance. Whether the sex is also fully informed is 
tangential to this more general project. 
 
C. Strengthening Consent: From Negative Consent to Affirmative Consent 
 
While some rape law scholars advocated for the abandonment of consent, 
others argued that the best way to reform rape doctrine was to adopt a more 
robust standard of consent. These scholars argue that rape is wrong because it 
infringes on sexual autonomy. Pursuant to this approach, autonomy is con-
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ceived as an affirmative exercise of choice as opposed to merely a choice that is 
not forced. According to Professor Stephen Schulhofer—the most well-known 
advocate of the affirmative consent view of rape—the serious physical intrusion 
that takes place during sexual intercourse demands that consent not “simply be 
the absence of clearly crystallized, clearly expressed opposition.”167 Instead, 
“nothing less than positive willingness, clearly communicated . . . should ever 
count as consent.”168 Neither ambiguous conduct, passivity, nor silence can 
count as consent to sex under this model. The approach is intended to “shift the 
emphasis of the consent inquiry away from concern over whether the woman 
explicitly communicated her opposition” to whether the man “has a clear indi-
cation of the other person’s consent.”169 By requiring clear words or actions that 
signal consent, we are “placing [the] onus on those who initiate sexual contact 
to secure agreement.”170 
Schulhofer’s influential theory of affirmative consent is developed at length 
in his book Unwanted Sex. Although the entire tome amounts to an elaboration 
of his theory of sexual autonomy, Schulhofer devotes only seven pages to ana-
lyzing whether and how deception may impinge on sexual autonomy.171 In con-
trast, he devotes close to two hundred pages to discussing coercion and power 
in the context of sexual relations. Schulhofer is especially concerned about cases 
in which “a woman confronts sexual pressure from a man who holds profes-
sional power over her,”172 and he includes separate chapters discussing the pres-
sures that are built into the superior/subordinate, doctor/patient, and lawyer/
client relationships.173 Schulhofer is particularly worried about these cases be-
cause the traditional approach to rape law “offers no help in these situations be-
cause the tactics men use, though sometimes flagrantly coercive, are not physi-
cally violent.”174 Of course, the traditional approach to rape law also offers little 
help in situations in which sex is obtained by deception. Schulhofer acknowl-
edges as much. Nevertheless, his autonomy-based view of rape has little impli-
cation for cases in which sex obtains as a result of material misrepresentations 
of fact. 
What this reveals is that Schulhofer’s project is focused almost in its entire-
ty on enhancing the non-coercive dimension of consent. The informational di-
 
167. STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 271 (1998).  
168. Id.  
169. Id.  
170. Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Ne-
oliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 872 (2008). 
171. SCHULHOFER, supra note 167, at 152–59. 
172. Id. at 5. 
173. Id. at 168–253.  
174. Id. at 5.  
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mension of autonomy, on the other hand, remains largely unaffected by his 
model. As a result, when Schulhofer talks about sexual autonomy, he is usually 
referring to the non-coercive aspect of autonomy. That is, he is primarily inter-
ested in ensuring that sex is uncoerced. While Schulhofer would surely prefer 
that sex also be informed, he clearly prioritizes freedom from coercion over 
freedom from misrepresentation. Schulhofer’s project—much like the projects 
of most modern rape reformers—is thus better understood as one that seeks to 
maximize sexual freedom as opposed to sexual autonomy. 
 
D. Modern Rape Reform: Sexual Freedom, Not Sexual Autonomy 
 
The standard story about the evolution of rape law begins with rape as a 
crime against the property interests of men and typically culminates with a 
more enlightened, less sexist conception of rape as a crime against sexual au-
tonomy.175 In terms of the defining elements of the offense, rape has slowly 
evolved from a crime of violence that required the perpetrator to use, or threat-
en to use, physical force to an offense against freedom of choice that is con-
summated when the perpetrator engages in sexual intercourse without con-
sent.176 
Of course, given that substantive criminal law is generally up to the states, 
the current state of rape in America varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion. Some states continue to require that the defendant use physical force.177 
These states do not typically criminalize sex that is obtained by using non-
physical forms of coercion or intercourse that takes place in the context of an 
inherently coercive relationship.178 Many jurisdictions also continue to require 
that the victim resist the defendant’s use of force.179 Other states adopt the af-
firmative consent model of rape that views the offense as a violation of sexual 
autonomy.180 States that come closer to adopting an autonomy-based model of 
sexual assault expressly criminalize sex obtained by the use of non-physical co-
ercion, sometimes going as far as criminalizing any sex that takes place in inher-
 
175. For an overview of the history of rape and rape reform, see Timothy W. Murphy, 
A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19, 19–21 (1996). 
176. GUYORA BINDER, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CRIMINAL LAW 239–43 
(2016). 
177. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2907.02(A)(2) (2017) (punishing rape when a person 
“compels the other person to submit [to sex] by force or threat of force”); see also 
Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 2007). 
178. Id. 
179. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 14:42.1 (2017) (defining rape as a case “[w]hen the victim 
is prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of physical violence”); see  
also State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219 (Idaho 2013). 
180. See, e.g., State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). 
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ently coercive relationships, regardless of whether the sex was nominally con-
sensual.181 
While many states continue to require force, the trend in recent years is to-
wards dropping the force requirement and instead criminalizing nonconsensual 
intercourse. The trend is inspired in great part by feminist critiques of tradi-
tional rape law and by the sexual autonomy model put forth by scholars like 
Schulhofer. As a result, it has become commonplace for courts and commenta-
tors to claim that the chief goal of modern rape reform is to protect sexual au-
tonomy.182 While this claim seems plausible at first glance, it turns out to be 
misleading in several ways, some of which have allowed scholars like Rubenfeld 
to mistakenly claim that rape-by-deception presents an irresolvable riddle for 
modern rape reformers. 
It is true that many contemporary rape reformers argue that rape is a crime 
against sexual autonomy. It is also true that modern rape statutes protect sexual 
autonomy more than traditional common law rape laws. However, as my brief 
recount of feminist and liberal rape literature reveals, modern rape reform has 
disproportionately focused on one dimension of autonomy, leaving the other 
two dimensions mostly intact. Although there are considerable differences 
amongst the different groups that have advocated for rape law reform during 
the last several decades, they all focused primarily on devising ways of enhanc-
ing the non-coercive dimension of autonomy. 
This is the best way of making sense of why modern rape reformers target-
ed some features of traditional rape law doctrine and not others. Contemporary 
critiques of traditional rape law unanimously called for the abolition of both the 
defendant force and victim resistance requirements,183 while also calling for the 
criminalization of non-physical forms of coercion.184 However, most did not 
call for broad criminalization of uninformed or misinformed sex.185 To be sure, 
some scholars argued in favor of broadly criminalizing sex obtained by fraud. 186 
Nevertheless, no rape law scholar has ever argued in favor of imposing a duty to 
inform prospective sex partners of all material facts related to intercourse, and 
only a handful of scholars have suggested that all material misrepresentations 
 
181. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 16-6-5.1 (2017); see also State v. Baptista, 894 A.2d 911 (R.I. 
2006). 
182. For judicial references describing rape as a crime against autonomy, see State in the 
Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277–78. For an autonomy-centered approach to 
rape in the scholarly literature, see generally Schulhofer, supra note 16.  
183. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 45–46. 
184. Id. at 92–93. 
185. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 37 (arguing for selective criminalization of rape by fraud). 
186. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986). 
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that result in sex ought to be punished.187 Others, like Feinberg188 and Schulho-
fer,189 have argued that sex obtained by fraud should be criminalized when the 
deception is coercive but generally not criminalized when it is not coercive. 
The approach to rape law that emerges from this literature is one that pri-
marily seeks to neutralize coercion rather than deception. While sex obtained 
by deception is certainly viewed by these scholars as pernicious, the problems 
raised by most cases of sex by deception pale in comparison with those raised by 
sex obtained by coercion. Given that the primary concern of contemporary rape 
scholars was neutralizing the coercion inherent in sexual relations that take 
place under conditions of male dominance, modern rape statutes are best un-
derstood as seeking to advance sexual freedom, not sexual autonomy. 
 
III. Solving the Riddle of Rape-by-Deception 
 
Professor Jed Rubenfeld argued in a recent influential article that modern 
rape reform generates a “riddle of rape-by-deception.”190 The riddle is that if 
rape is primarily an offense against sexual autonomy—as most modern ap-
proaches to sexual assault claim it is—then the law should prohibit sex by de-
ception just as much as it prohibits sex by force. After all, deception—like 
force—negates autonomy in many contexts outside of rape doctrine, including 
the laws of theft and contracts. Yet, contemporary rape statutes do not generally 
criminalize sex obtained by deception. So either rape statutes are guilty of a 
profound, inexplicable oversight, or rape law is not really about sexual autono-
my. Rubenfeld argues for the latter, claiming that rape law is really about the 
right to self-possession rather than about autonomy.191 
Rubenfeld’s account of rape law fails to grasp that autonomy and consent 
are multidimensional and scalar concepts that allow for the recognition of more 
and less robust conceptions of consent and autonomy across several distinct but 
interconnected dimensions. As I argued in Part I, autonomy is scalar in the 
sense that it can exist along a spectrum ranging from minimal to maximal au-
tonomy. It is multidimensional because (lack of) coercion, competency, and in-
formation are all important components of autonomy. 
Rubenfeld’s failure to account for the scalar and multidimensional nature 
of consent and autonomy prevents him from appreciating that we can selective-
ly criminalize rape-by-deception without calling into question the kind of sexu-
al autonomy (and consent) that lies at the core of rape offenses. More specifi-
 
187. Id. Estrich argues that material deception to obtain sex should be punished as sex-
ual assault in much the same way as material deception to obtain property is pun-
ished as theft. 
188. Joel Feinberg, Victims’ Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96 
ETHICS 330, 337 (1986). 
189. Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 93. 
190. Rubenfeld, supra note 12. 
191. Id. at 1425–27. 
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cally, he fails to appreciate that rape offenses principally seek to safeguard the 
non-coercive dimension of autonomy.192 Since modern rape laws are primarily 
about preventing coercion in sexual encounters, rather than deception, there is 
nothing perplexing about rape laws that only selectively criminalize deception. 
This is not to say, however, that modern rape laws are wholly indifferent to 
deception. While courts and scholars certainly do not require full disclosure of 
all material facts before valid consent to sex can obtain, they sometimes require 
disclosure of certain material facts (e.g., whether a person is HIV positive)193 
and often prohibit deception regarding certain other material facts (e.g., facts 
pertaining to the identity of the parties or to the nature of the act).194 
Reasonable people will surely disagree about how stringently courts ought 
to police the informational dimension of consent in the sexual context. Howev-
er, this disagreement is not about whether we actually care about sexual auton-
omy in these cases, as Rubenfeld appears to suggest. Rather, the disagreement is 
about the degree and kind of autonomy that should be recognized as legally rele-
vant in this context. Acknowledging that a certain degree of autonomy is 
enough to generate legally valid consent, even when more autonomy could be 
required, simply specifies the kind of autonomy that is relevant in these con-
texts rather than undermining the very notion of sexual autonomy. As courts 
and legislatures continue to rethink the boundaries of consent and sexual au-
tonomy in cases of rape-by-deception, the degree of autonomy that is deemed 
necessary for legally valid consent to sex to obtain will surely shift. But the 
change will occur within the domain of autonomy rather than outside of it. 
Recognition of more (or less) autonomy presupposes that some degree of au-
tonomy is already present. As a result, the failure of courts and modern rape re-
form statutes to criminalize all sex obtained as a consequence of material decep-
tion does not show that rape law is primarily about something other than sexual 
autonomy. Instead, it reveals that autonomy is a scalar notion that may be co-
herently protected more or less depending on the way in which the balance is 
struck between the competing interests at stake in any given situation. 
 
 
192. The claim that rape laws are primarily about the non-coercive dimension of (sexu-
al) autonomy is essentially identical to the claim that rape laws are primarily about 
(sexual) freedom, given that “freedom” is defined as the absence of coercion. It is 
important to note that the concepts of “freedom” and “autonomy” are not in ten-
sion with each other. “Freedom” is simply another way of referring to the “non-
coercive” dimension of autonomy.  
193. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 5-14-123 (2017) (making it a crime to have sex without first 
informing the other person of the presence of HIV). For a more detailed discus-
sion of these cases, see infra Section IV.B. 
194. See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), super-
seded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(d)(4) (2017), as recognized in People v. 
Robinson, 370 P.3d 1043 (Cal. 2016) (reviewing the scholarly literature on sex by 
deception). For more discussion of the selective way in which current rape law 
criminalizes rape-by-deception, see infra Section IV.C.  
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A. The Misleading Analogy Between Consent in Theft and Rape Law 
 
Rubenfeld argues that rape law does not really protect autonomy because it 
fails to criminalize sex by deception as broadly as theft law criminalizes obtain-
ing property by deception.195 If consent is not typically invalidated by deception 
in the context of rape law, then it must be because consent is not really essential 
at all. Once again, Rubenfeld’s reasoning is flawed because he fails to appreciate 
the scalarity and multidimensionality of consent. 
By focusing solely on the informational dimension of consent, Rubenfeld 
ignores the fact that consent in sexual assault law is sometimes more robust 
than consent in theft law and that—as a result—it is not really the case that 
consent in rape law is weaker than consent in theft law. An interdimensional 
analysis of consent and autonomy in the context of rape and theft doctrine re-
veals that both areas of law protect a comparable degree of autonomy, but that 
they do so along different dimensions. Theft law emphasizes the informational 
dimensions of consent and autonomy, whereas rape law focuses more on the 
non-coercive dimension. Furthermore—and perhaps more importantly—
neither rape law nor theft law protects the informational dimension of autono-
my as robustly as it is protected in other legal realms. Modern rape reform pro-
hibits some instances of misinformed consent but not all.196 It also does not 
prohibit uninformed consent, given that it does not generally require that par-
ties disclose material facts prior to having sex.197 In contrast, modern theft law 
broadly prohibits affirmative misrepresentations that lead to misinformed con-
sent.198 However, like rape law, it does not generally prohibit uninformed con-
sent that is the product of a failure to disclose material facts. Consent in medical 
malpractice is more robust than consent in either rape or theft law—there is an 
affirmative duty to disclose material facts to patients prior to obtaining their 
consent to treatment. 
 Unfortunately, Rubenfeld glosses over these important distinctions be-
cause he approaches consent and autonomy as all-or-nothing concepts. Where 
Rubenfeld sees deception he cannot see consent, and where he sees autonomy 
he cannot see misrepresentation. But since consent and autonomy are matters 
of degree, they are consistent with certain amounts and kinds of deception. The 
amount of deception that is compatible with the kind of consent and autonomy 
that we demand in a particular context will depend on the circumstances. We 
will tolerate more deception in some situations and less in others, depending on 
many factors, including the harms that will ensue if deception takes place and 
 
195. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1407. 
196. For a more detailed discussion of the classic instances of deception prohibited by 
modern rape law, see infra Section IV.C.  
197. However, statutes often impose some criminal liability for a person who fails to 
disclose that he is infected with a dangerous STD prior to having sex. See infra Sec-
tion IV.B. 
198. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
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whether there is considerable asymmetry of information between the parties. As 
the magnitude and likelihood of harm from misinformation increases, the case 
for broadly prohibiting deception gets stronger. By the same token, the more 
that a certain interaction is plagued by information asymmetry, the stronger the 
case for broadening the prohibition on deception. Since the need for prohibit-
ing deception varies widely from situation to situation, we will draw the line be-
tween permissible and impermissible deception differently depending on con-
text. But the fact that different lines will need to be drawn does not mean that 
consent and autonomy cease to be meaningful concepts. Sometimes the line 
drawn in one context will enhance informational autonomy compared to an-
other context. On other occasions it will not. 
Relatedly, Rubenfeld is mistaken to claim that rape law must match the 
lines drawn by the law of theft regarding permissible and impermissible decep-
tion because his comparison point is arbitrary. Why should rape law not match 
the lines drawn by medical malpractice law regarding deception? For that mat-
ter, why should theft law not protect autonomy as much as it is protected in the 
context of medical treatment? Once we acknowledge that consent can be valid 
even if informational autonomy is not fully secured, then we are merely hag-
gling about price. Rubenfeld claims that a rape law committed to sexual auton-
omy should draw the same lines that theft law does regarding deception.199 But I 
can pick another legal doctrine as a point of reference and argue that the line 
should be placed elsewhere both for rape law and for theft doctrine. If I take the 
Fourth Amendment doctrine of consent to police searches as my baseline, then 
rape law protects informational autonomy more than adequately. If instead I 
choose medical malpractice as my baseline, it does not. Surely whether infor-
mational autonomy in particular and autonomy in general are sufficiently pro-
tected by rape law should not depend on what legal doctrine I take as my base-
line. Instead, it should depend on whether the circumstances that typically 
surround the kind of interaction at issue demand robust protection of informa-
tional autonomy or not. For modern rape reformers, the chief threat to sexual 
autonomy comes from coercion, not deception. If this is the case, there is noth-
ing mysterious about the fact that modern rape statutes do not protect the in-
formational dimension of autonomy as much as the non-coercive dimension. 
 
B. Rape-by-Deception and the Materiality Problem 
 
Rubenfeld argues that a view of rape that takes consent seriously must 
acknowledge that “material” deception negates consent to sex.200 He then ar-
gues that modern rape law does not respect autonomy because it fails to pro-
hibit material deception as broadly as it is prohibited pursuant to contract law 
or theft law. This argument is flawed because it mistakenly assumes that stand-
ards of materiality hold constant across different areas of law. 
 
199. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1407. 
200. Id. 
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To understand why this assumption is mistaken, it is useful to compare the 
meaning of material deception in the law of medical malpractice with the 
meaning of material deception in the context of theft by false pretenses. In the 
medical malpractice context, a failure to disclose important facts related to a 
given medical treatment is typically considered “material” deception.201 It is 
material in the non-legal sense because it makes a difference to the patient’s de-
cision-making process. It also satisfies the legal threshold for materiality that 
courts have crafted in the medical malpractice context. In contrast, a failure to 
disclose important facts related to a property exchange is generally not consid-
ered “material” deception under the law of theft by false pretenses.202 While 
more kinds of deception count as material under the law of medical malpractice 
than under the law of theft by false pretenses, it would be erroneous to infer 
from this that there is something wrong with the standard of materiality in the 
theft by deception context or that the law of theft is not really concerned with 
consent or autonomy. 
Rubenfeld makes the same mistake when he argues that if deception is ma-
terial enough to negate consent in the context of theft, it ought to be enough to 
negate consent in the context of rape. While he is correct that more kinds of de-
ception count as material under the law of theft than under the law of rape, this 
does not mean that the standard of materiality in the law of rape is wrong or 
that consent is not taken seriously by the law of rape. 
Ultimately, what counts as material in a certain context depends on a mul-
tiplicity of competing factors. Sometimes the balance of these factors suggests 
that we ought to set the bar for materiality quite low, as in the case of medical 
malpractice. On other occasions, analysis of the competing factors counsels in 
favor of setting a higher standard of materiality. Whether such decisions are 
correct does not depend on some fixed materiality measure, as Rubenfeld’s 
analysis presupposes. Rather, it depends on whether there are good reasons for 
setting the materiality bar higher or lower in any given context. In the particular 
context of rape, I believe there are good reasons for setting the materiality bar 
quite high when it comes to deception. I take up an analysis of these reasons in 
the next two sections. 
 
C. The Nature of Modern Rape Reform, the Purposes of Rape Law, and the 
Problem of Rape-by-Deception 
 
I have argued that a plausible case can be made for a conception of consent 
in the context of rape law that is quite robust along the non-coercive dimension 
and considerably less so along the informational dimension. According to this 
 
201. See, e.g., Martin by Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Wis. 1995).  
202. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 19.7(b)(3) (2d ed. 2003)(“A 
misrepresentation for false pretenses generally requires some affirmative con-
duct.”). 
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view, consent to sex must be significantly uncoerced but it can be somewhat 
uninformed. 
To his credit, Rubenfeld discusses the plausibility of this approach. Since “a 
coercion-based rape law would still exclude most cases of sexual deception” be-
cause “deception is not coercion,”203 Rubenfeld acknowledges that the result 
would be “a happy medium between a rape law so narrow that it prohibits only 
sex induced by physical force and a rape law so broad that it jails people who 
have sex while concealing their true age, looks, income, or degree of romantic 
interest.”204 Thus, “[a] coercion requirement offers an appealing compromise 
between the two extreme positions, reaching desired results while bringing rape 
law a step closer to sexual autonomy.”205 
In spite of the admittedly attractive nature of this approach, Rubenfeld re-
jects it because “[t]he coercion requirement’s exclusion of rape-by-deception is 
contradicted by its own internal logic.”206 In order to demonstrate that viewing 
rape as uncoerced sex is conceptually problematic, Rubenfeld relies on an anal-
ogy between coercion and deception: “[a]n anti-coercion principle is attractive 
because coerced sex is unconsented-to sex.”207 However, “if unconsented-to sex 
is rape law’s target, then deceptive sex ought to be punished as well.”208 Ex-
pressed syllogistically, the argument goes like this: 
 
(1) All nonconsensual sex is punished as rape. 
(2) Sex obtained by deception is nonconsensual. 
(3) Therefore, sex obtained by deception should be punished as rape. 
 
Rubenfeld’s argument falters because premise (2) is objectionable on both 
conceptual and practical grounds. From a conceptual perspective, he once again 
fails to consider that autonomy and consent have a non-coercive, and an in-
formational dimension and that in some contexts lawmakers have decided to 
prioritize protection of one dimension over the other. Furthermore, if we be-
lieve that the chief threat to the legitimacy of sexual interactions is coercion, 
and not deception, then we may wish to draw the lines between sex and rape in 
precisely the way that Rubenfeld objects to. 
From a practical perspective, Rubenfeld’s argument against viewing rape as 
uncoerced sex fails because he does not fully appreciate the real world concerns 
that generated the modern rape reform movement. The turn from force to con-
sent in modern rape reform was not the product of a sudden realization that 
sexual autonomy mattered. Traditional rape law came under fire because it was 
erected upon conceptions of male aggressiveness and female passivity that are 
 
203. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1411. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1412. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
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characteristic of a patriarchal society.209 The requirements that the perpetrator 
obtain sex by physical force and that the victim physically resist were objection-
able because they perpetuated a male-centered view of appropriate sexual con-
duct, regardless of whether consent to sex was nominally obtained. Under con-
ditions of male dominance, female consent to sex was viewed as inherently 
suspect anyway.210 In the language of coercion, we would say that sex in a male-
dominated society was viewed as problematic because it was inherently coercive 
for women. It was this belief that heterosexual sex in a patriarchal social order 
was inherently coercive that spurred modern rape reform, not an abstract con-
cern for maximizing autonomy.211 
It is thus unsurprising that the reforms that ensued focused on outlawing 
coerced sex rather than sex obtained by deception. To borrow from Justice 
Holmes’ oft-cited phrase, the life of rape reform “has not been logic . . . [i]t has 
been experience.”212 Rape scholars focused on the non-coercive dimensions of 
consent and autonomy because the female experience of sex in a male-
dominated society was characterized by aggression. Once placed in its proper 
context, consent in rape law emerges as a tool to counteract male aggression in 
both its physical and non-physical forms. Since modern rape reformers and 
scholars were primarily concerned with addressing coercion, their frequent ref-
erences to sexual autonomy as the centerpiece of modern approaches to rape 
law should be understood against this backdrop. 
This suggests that what contemporary rape reform scholars usually mean 
when they argue that we should embrace a given change in rape law, because 
doing so promotes the foundational right to sexual autonomy, is that the pro-
posed change enhances the non-coercive dimension of autonomy. Since the in-
formational dimension of autonomy is largely tangential to the central feminist 
project of rethinking the coercive component of autonomy, most references to 
autonomy in the rape reform literature are of limited usefulness in the rape by 
fraud context. To be sure, the move from force to consent also served to en-
hance the more liberal, abstract, and gender neutral notion of (sexual) autono-
my. But this was only a salutary side effect of the main project, which was to do 
what could be done to counteract the aggressive view of sexuality imbued into 
the fabric of a patriarchal social order. The strong commitment to enhanced 
freedom in the coercive dimension that modern rape reform scholars display 
does not necessarily commit them to advocating for an equally robust recogni-
tion of informational autonomy. Once the view of rape as uncoerced sex is 
placed in its proper historical and social context, the tension that Rubenfeld 
perceives between broadly criminalizing sex by coercion and only exceptionally 
punishing sex by deception disappears. 
 
209. See authorities discussed supra notes 132–41.  
210. See supra notes 142–43. 
211. Id. 
212. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see also Falk, supra note 
26.  
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In more philosophical terms, defining rape as uncoerced sex is justified if 
we view the modern rape reform movement as one that sought to maximize 
sexual freedom or the non-coercive dimension of autonomy213 as opposed to 
sexual autonomy itself. That is, as a movement that emphasized sexual choices 
that were not constrained by external pressures as opposed to sexual choices 
that were fully informed. I believe that this view of rape is more compatible 
with both the theoretical commitments of rape reformers and the practical real-
ity of rape. Regarding the conceptual underpinnings of rape reform, the com-
mon thread that holds modern rape literature together is the worry that—under 
conditions of male dominance—female submission to sex is problematic even 
when physical force is not used. The concern with better understanding and 
counteracting the overt and subtle forms of coercion that shape sexual interac-
tions in a patriarchal society is perfectly compatible with an approach to rape 
that primarily defines the crime as uncoerced sex. With regard to the practical 
reality of rape, the general experience of rape that informs modern rape law re-
form is that of sex that occurs because men want it even when women do not 
want it. Women submit to sex even when they do not want to because there are 
obvious and not so obvious social pressures that consciously and unconsciously 
constrain a woman’s decision to have sex. An approach to rape that defines the 
crime as uncoerced sex is well-equipped to neutralize these pressures. 
Once rape is viewed as a crime against sexual freedom, Rubenfeld’s argu-
ment against defining rape as sex without coercion loses its force. Since coer-
cion impinges on freedom in ways that deception does not, there is no contra-
diction in broadly prohibiting coerced sex and only selectively punishing 
deceptive sex. 
An objection to this solution of the riddle is that the kind of freedom that is 
protected by this view of rape is nugatory. But this is not so. While more free-
dom or autonomy could obviously be protected both along the non-coercive 
and the informational dimensions, ensuring that sexual intercourse takes place 
without undue pressures is not a trivial matter. This is especially the case given 
the history of rape and rape reform. To the extent that the chief issue that rape 
reformers sought to address was the inherent compulsion that permeates sexual 
encounters under conditions of male dominance, a definition of rape that sig-
nificantly broadens the kinds of coercion that give rise to liability is a logical 
and welcome development. 
 
D. Defending the View of Rape as Uncoerced Sex 
 
So far, I have argued that defining rape as uncoerced sex is perfectly com-
patible with the goals that modern rape reforms sought to advance. But can a 
definition of rape that mostly focuses on the non-coercive dimension of auton-
omy be defended on other grounds? Are there good reasons for viewing rape as 
 
213. It is once again worth clarifying that what I mean by (sexual) freedom is coexten-
sive with the non-coercive dimension of (sexual) autonomy.  
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a crime that seeks primarily to advance sexual freedom as opposed to sexual au-
tonomy? I believe there are. 
It could be argued that we ought to prioritize freedom over autonomy be-
cause freedom from coercion is more important than freedom from deception. 
More specifically, it is plausible to argue that coercion is—all things being 
equal—more wrongful than deception. This view is implicit in our legal system. 
Coercion is generally regarded as criminal. Physical coercion is typically pun-
ished as assault or battery. Non-physical forms of coercion are often punished 
as extortion or blackmail.214 Coercion that results in sex is generally punished as 
rape, while coercion that results in takings of property is typically punished as 
theft or robbery. In contrast, deception is not generally regarded as criminal. 
The most blameworthy kind of deception—lying215—is only punishable in cer-
tain contexts, such as theft by false pretenses and perjury. The other two kinds 
of deception—misleading216 and passively deceiving217—are generally not pun-
ished at all. If coercion is more wrongful than deception, then it is defensible to 
impose criminal liability in most cases of coerced sex while not doing so in most 
cases of sex by deception. While both coerced and deceived sex may be wrong-
ful, it can be plausibly argued that coerced sex more often rises to the degree of 
wrongfulness that should trigger the imposition of criminal liability than sex by 
deception. 
There are also good reasons to believe that coercion is more of a problem 
than deception in the specific context of rape. This is especially the case when 
we take into account the power imbalance that exists between males and fe-
males in a patriarchal society and how this power disparity creates inherently 
coercive circumstances when it comes to sexual relations between men and 
women. While heterosexual sex and coercion are intertwined in a patriarchal 
society, conditions of male dominance do not generate any special connection 
between sex and deception. Although some men surely use deception to obtain 
sex, so do some women. An empirical study on the deceptive practices of men 
and women in dating situations found that both men and women believe that 
“women are more likely to lie about their physical attractiveness, while . . . men 
are more likely to lie about their financial status, and their likelihood for com-
 
214. Regarding extortion, see generally Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 407–08 (2003), which explains that “extortion necessarily in-
volves the use of coercive conduct to obtain property.” Regarding blackmail, see 
generally Miller v. Lewis, 381 F. Supp. 2d 773, 791 (N.D. Ill. 2005), stating that the 
“gravamen” of blackmail “is the exercise of coercion or an improper influence.” 
215. Lying is asserting something that one knows is false. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, 
CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 78 (2006) 
(defining lying verbal deception as “asserting what one believes is literally false”). 
216. Misleading is making an incomplete but true statement with the intent of leading 
the listener to believe something that is false. Id. 
217. Passively deceiving is deliberately withholding material information. See, e.g., Lars-
ry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW & PHIL. 393, 
414 (2003). 
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mitment to a relationship.”218 As a result, “both men and women . . . expect that 
members of the opposite sex will lie” in the context of social and sexual interac-
tions.219 It is thus unclear whether deception in the sexual context is more of a 
problem for women than for men. Since sex in a patriarchal society is inherent-
ly coercive but not inherently uninformed, the effects of patriarchal conceptions 
of appropriate sexual conduct are considerably more problematic in the context 
of coercion than in the informational context. 
More importantly, it is not really necessary for men to use deception in or-
der to obtain sex in a male-dominated society. Under social conditions that en-
courage male aggressiveness and female passivity, coercion is so infused into the 
fabric of sexuality that there is little need for men to use deception in order to 
obtain sex. Until we succeed in weeding coercion out of sexuality, there are con-
tingent reasons for feminist rape reformers to care more about coercion than 
about deception. 
An additional rationale that may justify protecting the informational di-
mension of consent more in medical malpractice and theft cases is the informa-
tional asymmetry that often characterizes the typical doctor/patient relationship 
and that is sometimes present in commercial property exchanges. In run-of-
the-mill cases, doctors know exponentially more than patients about the nature 
and risks of medical treatment. In light of this asymmetry, disclosure rules that 
level the disparity of information seem sensible. To a lesser extent, the same is 
true regarding property exchanges. Given the nature of commercial transac-
tions in modern times, it is common in some contexts for certain actors to con-
sistently have more information than others.220 There is no such asymmetry in 
the context of sexual intercourse. When it comes to sex, there is no inherent 
reason why one party will regularly have more information than the other. In 
terms of information asymmetry, property exchanges seem to occupy an inter-
mediate position between sexual interactions and doctor/patient relationships. 
Property transactions are more often plagued with informational asymmetry 
than sexual relations but less often than medical treatment decisions. This pro-
vides a plausible explanation of why theft law prohibits deception more broadly 





IV. Framing Principles for Criminalizing Rape-by-Deception 
 
218. Joseph J. Benz, Mary K. Anderson & Richard L. Miller, Attributions of Deception in 
Dating Situations, 55 PSYCHOL. REC. 305, 312 (2005).  
219. Id. at 313. 
220. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 
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So far I have argued that modern rape law is best understood as seeking to 
protect sexual freedom as opposed to sexual autonomy itself. Expressed in 
terms of the dimensions of autonomy, I have argued that to the extent that 
modern rape law is concerned with autonomy, it is largely concerned with the 
non-coercive aspect of autonomy. Sexual freedom is about choosing to engage 
in sex without being pressured into doing so by external constraints. That is, 
sexual freedom is about the non-coercive dimension of autonomy rather than 
the informational or competency dimensions. According to this view, we can 
consent to have sex even when not fully informed of all relevant facts, as long as 
our choice is not constrained by the coercive acts of others. The paradigmatic 
case of nonconsensual sex that rape law seeks to prevent is thus coerced sex.221 
Uncoerced sex, on the other hand, is not generally rape. Given that deception is 
not usually coercive, sex by deception would not generally amount to rape un-
der this view. As a result, the riddle of rape-by-deception is solved, since there is 
no tension between the view of rape as coerced sex and the refusal to broadly 
criminalize sex obtained by lies. 
This does not mean, however, that sex by deception should never be crimi-
nalized. Although a thorough analysis of all of the circumstances in which ob-
taining sex by deception ought to be punished is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, in what follows I provide some brief framing principles that may help 
animate future discussions about what to call sex obtained by lies and whether 
to criminalize it. 
 
A. Coercive Deception 
 
While deception does not generally coerce, there are exceptional cases in 
which it may. The most obvious case is that of a misrepresentation that may 
lead a person to believe that their choices are constrained when they actually are 
not. Take the case of a police officer who deceptively tells a suspect that custody 
of her children will be taken from her if she does not confess to a certain crime. 
This lie can be described as coercive because it pressures the suspect into con-
fessing. To be clear, the coercion does not emanate from the lie itself. Many lies 
do not pressure us into making a certain choice. There is no coercion if the sus-
pect asks the police officer if he is a God-fearing person and the officer falsely 
responds affirmatively with the hope that this will endear him to the suspect. 
While the officer has certainly lied in this case, the lie is not coercive. This is the 
case even if the lie makes it more likely that the suspect will confess. 
By definition, a view of rape as coerced sex would prohibit sex obtained by 
coercive deception. Two oft-discussed cases are illustrative. In Don Moran v. 
 
221. It is worth repeating that the notion of coercion that I have in mind is quite ex-
pansive. Sex can be coerced if it is the product of physical force, but also if it re-
sults as a consequence of non-physical pressures. There can also be inherently co-
ercive relationships and circumstances that may lead to a finding of coercion in 
the context of sexual relationships.  
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People, a doctor told a fifteen-year-old girl that she had a life-threatening, ulcer-
ated, inverted uterus and that the only way to save her life was to “enlarge her 
parts.”222 He explained that this could be done with instruments, but that she 
would likely die in the process.223 A less dangerous alternative, he said, would be 
for her to have sexual intercourse with him.224 After initially objecting, the girl 
finally agreed to have sex with the doctor in order to save her life.225 Once the 
girl’s parents found out that this was all a ruse, the doctor was charged and con-
victed of rape by fraud.226 The conviction was overturned on appeal because 
rape required that sex be obtained by physical force and fraud does not amount 
to such force.227 
The kind of deception used by the defendant in Don Moran in order to ob-
tain sex certainly qualifies as coercive. The defendant’s lies did not merely 
amount to garden-variety deception that simply makes the victim’s choice less 
informed. His lies had the effect of pressuring the girl into consenting to sex 
when she did not desire to do so. The pressure was considerable, since she was 
falsely led to believe that she would likely die if she did not have sex with the de-
fendant. Given the obviously coercive nature of the deception in Don Moran, 
the defendant’s conduct can easily be described as rape under the coerced sex 
view of the offense. 
A modern case with a similar fact pattern is Boro v. Superior Court.228 The 
defendant in Boro falsely told the victim that he was a doctor and that he was in 
possession of medical tests that showed that she had a dangerous blood disease 
that could be lethal.229 He then told the victim that she could be cured by hav-
ing sex with an anonymous donor that had been injected with a special serum 
that counteracts the disease.230 The victim had sex with the donor, who hap-
pened to be the defendant.231 The prosecution charged the defendant with rap-
ing the victim, alleging that his fraud made her unconscious of the nature of the 
act.232 The Court of Appeals disagreed with the prosecution’s reading of the 
statute, finding that the defendant’s conduct amounted to “fraud in the in-
 
222. 25 Mich. 356, 357 (1872) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
223. Id.  
224. Id.  
225. Id.  
226. Id. at 356–57. 
227. Id. at 367. 
228. 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE  
§ 289(d)(4) (2017), as recognized in People v. Robinson, 370 P.3d 1043 (Cal. 2016). 
229. Id. at 123.  
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ducement” rather than “fraud in the factum,” and only the latter kind of fraud 
could generate liability for rape.233 The court explained that fraud in the factum 
takes place when the defendant deceives the victim as to the nature of the act or 
when the defendant impersonates being the victim’s husband.234 It then held 
that the defendant in Boro did not deceive the victim as to the nature of the act, 
given that the victim was aware that she was consenting to intercourse.235 In-
stead, the defendant’s deception amounted to fraud in the inducement, which is 
not punishable as rape.236 
Like the deception in Don Moran, the lies told by the defendant in Boro 
were clearly coercive. The deception not only made the victim’s decision to have 
sex misinformed, but also pressured her into consenting. As a result of the de-
fendant’s lies, the victim believed that she would die unless she engaged in sexu-
al intercourse. In light of the coercive nature of the deception in Boro, the de-
fendant would be convicted of rape under an approach to rape that views the 
offense as coerced sex. 
 
B. Deception that May Result in Serious Physical Harm 
 
Medical malpractice law protects the informational dimension of autono-
my because the consequences of misinformed consent in the medical context 
are often quite dire. In addition to violating patient autonomy, uninformed 
consent to medical treatment may lead to serious bodily injury or even death. 
As a result, the rules governing medical malpractice require not only that doc-
tors abstain from lying to patients, but also that they affirmatively disclose ma-
terial facts related to treatment so that a patient can make a well-informed deci-
sion. 
A similar argument can be made in certain limited contexts when it comes 
to sexual relations. The most obvious case involves people who engage in sexual 
intercourse without disclosing to their partners that they are infected with a 
dangerous sexually transmitted disease (STD). The failure to disclose this in-
formation not only makes the resulting sex uninformed in a material way, but 
also may result in considerable physical injury and—in extreme cases—death. 
Failure to disclose such a condition prior to engaging in sex can thus be said to 
not only violate the partner’s sexual autonomy, but also her physical well-being. 
As a result, a strong case can be made in favor of making it a crime to have sex 
without prior disclosure of a dangerous STD. 
If rape is primarily conceived of as coerced sex, it is not evident that having 
sex without disclosing a serious STD should amount to rape. While engaging in 
this conduct certainly creates a risk of considerable physical and non-physical 
 
233. Id. at 125–26.  
234. Id.  
235. Id. at 124–25.  
236. Boro was subsequently superseded by statute, as the California Supreme Court 
acknowledged in People v. Robinson, 370 P.3d 1043 (Cal. 2016). 
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harm, it is difficult to describe a failure to disclose an STD as coercive. Conse-
quently, sex obtained without such a disclosure would likely not amount to 
rape if the offense is limited to coercive sex. Nevertheless, the considerable po-
tential for harm that is inherent in engaging in this kind of conduct counsels in 
favor of punishment. For example, an obvious way of doing so is by creating a 
crime of intentional or reckless exposure to HIV. This is the approach taken by 
many jurisdictions in the United States.237 These statutes are often enforced.238 
In 2008, for example, an HIV-infected man was convicted by an Iowa court of 
“criminal transmission of HIV” for having sex without disclosing to his partner 
that he was infected with HIV.239 
It is important to note that the reason this kind of deception may rise to the 
level of blameworthiness necessary to trigger the imposition of a criminal sanc-
tion is because it exposes people to serious physical injury rather than solely be-
cause it violates their sexual autonomy. As such, the decision to criminalize this 
kind of deception does not lead to any particular conclusion regarding whether 
to criminalize deception in other contexts. 
 
C. Deception that Amounts to an Abuse of Authority by a Person in a  
Position of Trust 
 
There are some cases in which deception also amounts to an abuse of au-
thority in the context of a relationship in which one party is entrusted with the 
care of another. When the party entrusted with the care of another engages in 
harmful deception, she has abused her authority and thus harmed the party that 
she was supposed to care for in a special way. There is a sense in which the de-
ception in these contexts is doubly blameworthy. On the one hand, it is blame-
worthy for the same reason that all deception is worthy of blame: it interferes 
with the other person’s informational autonomy. On the other hand, deception 
in this context is also blameworthy because it amounts to a breach of that trust. 
It is because of this added blameworthiness that these acts of deception are 
strong candidates for the imposition of criminal liability. 
 
237. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 5-14-123 (2017) (making it a crime to have sex without first 
informing the other person of the presence of HIV); see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & 
RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1080 (3d ed. 1982) (giving prosecution statistics).  
238. The Center for HIV Law and Policy reported 279 prosecutions and arrests for HIV 
exposure in the United States from 2008 to 2016. See Positive Justice Project, Prose-
cutions and Arrests for HIV Exposure in the United States, 2008–2016, CTR. HIV L. & 
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Such breaches of trust are exemplified by cases in which doctors falsely tell 
their patients that they are going to perform a medical examination when what 
they actually end up doing is engaging in a sexual act. The most obvious exam-
ple is that of a gynecologist who tells the patient that he will insert a medical in-
strument in her vagina but instead inserts his penis. In McNair v. State, for ex-
ample, a gynecologist asked patients to bend over in order to perform a routine 
medical examination, but instead anally penetrated them with his penis.240 
By deceiving the patient in this manner, the doctor is not only violating her 
sexual autonomy, but also egregiously breaching the trust that patients place in 
their physicians. When doctors take advantage of this trust, they abuse their au-
thority in a most flagrant kind of way. This was the view taken by the court in 
McNair when it upheld the defendant’s conviction for rape. In explaining why 
the defendant’s conduct amounted to rape, the court pointed out that he “held 
a position of trust and respect reserved for members of the medical communi-
ty,”241 and that because of this “[h]is patients came to his office on the premise 
that they would receive ethical, professional medical treatment for their ail-
ments.”242 The deception in this case was particularly blameworthy because the 
defendant “abused his professional status and trust during medical examina-
tions that were staged to exploit his unsuspecting and vulnerable patients and 
gratify his personal sexual desires.”243 
This view of the wrongfulness of these cases is not intended to minimize the 
harm to the patient’s sexual autonomy that ensues when a doctor tricks the pa-
tient into having sex with him. Rather, it is meant to supplement that harm 
with the additional harm that follows from the physician’s breach of trust. This 
kind of sex by deception is thus more blameworthy than the run-of-the-mill 
deception used to obtain sex. As the McNair Court explained, these cases are 
particularly worthy of condemnation because the deception amounts to a “mis-
use[] [of the doctor’s] professional status” and to a breach of “trust” that 
“place[s] his patients in situations where they became his vulnerable and un-
suspecting prey.”244 
The standard approach to these kinds of cases in judicial opinions is to treat 
them as instances of “fraud in the factum” that amount to rape because they 
negate the victim’s consent.245 They amount to fraud in the factum because the 
deception prevents the victim from understanding the nature of the act. That is, 
the deception causes the victim to believe that she is consenting to something 
other than sexual intercourse. 
 
240. 825 P.2d 571, 572–73 (Nev. 1992).  
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The problem with the fraud in the factum approach is that it fails to crimi-
nalize deception that induces patients to have sex with the doctor if the patient/
victim was aware that she was consenting to sexual intercourse. In Common-
wealth v. Goldenberg, for example, a woman seeking an abortion had sex with 
her doctor after he told her that having sexual intercourse with him would help 
with the procedure.246 The defendant was convicted of rape, but the conviction 
was later overturned on appeal because “[f]raud cannot be allowed to supply 
the place of the force which the [rape] statute makes mandatory.”247 
The Goldenberg case would be decided differently pursuant to the approach 
that I advocate here. The considerable degree of blameworthiness in these kinds 
of cases is not the product of the somewhat arbitrary distinction between fraud 
in the factum and fraud in the inducement. While it is true that the victim in a 
fraud in the factum case (like McNair) is unaware that she is consenting to in-
tercourse whereas a victim in a fraud in the inducement case (like Goldenberg) 
is cognizant that she has acquiesced to having sex with the physician, both cases 
feature deception by physicians in a position of authority that flagrantly breach-
es the trust that their patients have placed in them. As a result, both doctors 
seem like appropriate candidates for criminal liability. 
My approach would also generate liability in abuse of authority cases out-
side of the medical context, such as in the English case of Rex v. Williams.248 The 
defendant in Williams had sex with his music student after he pretended to be 
testing her breathing power with an “instrument” and told her that her voice 
would improve if she had sexual intercourse with him, as doing so would open 
her air passages.249 The deception in this case does not amount to fraud in the 
factum because the student was aware that she was consenting to sex. As a re-
sult, it would not generate liability in the many jurisdictions that embrace the 
fraud in the factum/fraud in the inducement distinction. In contrast, the de-
fendant in Williams would be punished pursuant to the approach that I defend 
here because the teacher’s deception amounted to a breach of the trust that the 
student justifiably placed in him. As such, the deception results in an abuse of 
authority that is particularly worthy of condemnation. 
 
D. Other Cases of Deception 
 
As I argued in Part II, modern rape statutes primarily seek to protect 
against sexual coercion. Since sex obtained by deception is not usually coerced, 
refusing to broadly criminalize sex by deception is not in tension with the chief 
goals of contemporary rape reform. There may nevertheless be cases of sex by 
deception that we wish to criminalize for reasons that go beyond those that in-
spired the modern rape reform movement. I have suggested three groups of 
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cases that I believe are worthy candidates for criminal punishment. They in-
clude cases in which the deception used to obtain sex is also coercive, instances 
in which great harm over and above the violation of sexual autonomy may en-
sue as a result of the deception, and situations in which the deception amounts 
to a breach of trust by a person who occupies a special position of authority. 
This list is not intended to be exhaustive. It merely accounts for cases in 
which criminalization ought to be uncontroversial because the harms caused in 
each of these instances go well beyond the violation of the informational di-
mension of autonomy. In the coercive deception cases, the misrepresentations 
also violate the non-coercive dimension of autonomy. In the second group of 
cases, the failure to disclose prior to having sex may result in considerable harm 
to the physical well-being of the person and, in some cases, death. Finally, the 
deception in abuse of authority cases amounts to a flagrant breach of trust that 
is of considerable blameworthiness. 
There will surely be other groups of cases of sex by deception that warrant 
criminalization. While identifying such cases is beyond the scope of this Article, 
it is useful to briefly highlight several considerations that ought to be taken into 
account when deciding whether to punish additional cases of sex by deception. 
 
1. Lying To Obtain Sex Is Generally Worse than Having Sex Without 
Prior Disclosure of Material Facts 
 
As an initial consideration, it is important to take into account how much 
the deception impacted the informational dimension of autonomy. As shown in 
Part I, the informational dimension of autonomy is scalar. Consequently, 
choices can range from being fully informed, to partially informed, to com-
pletely uninformed. Different kinds of deception will have a differential impact 
on how informed the resulting choice is. Some choices will be misinformed be-
cause of affirmative misrepresentations (i.e., lying), whereas some will simply be 
uninformed because of failure to disclose material facts (i.e., passive deception). 
There are three reasons that make the case in favor of criminalizing sex ob-
tained by lying stronger than the case supporting criminalization of sex without 
prior disclosure of material facts. First, criminalization of lying infringes less on 
our liberty than punishing failures to disclose. The duty imposed when lying is 
criminalized is solely to abstain from intentionally making false assertions. In 
contrast, the duty imposed when an obligation to disclose is required is to af-
firmatively reveal facts about your person. The latter duty is considerably more 
liberty-infringing than the former. Second, lying usually impacts informational 
autonomy more than passive deception, given that misinformed choices are less 
autonomous than uninformed choices. Third, lying is generally more blame-
worthy than passive deception.250 It follows that obtaining sex as a result of af-
 
250. See generally Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral 
Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
157, 165 (2001).  
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firmative fraud is more worthy of condemnation than obtaining sex as a result 
of failing to disclose material facts. 
While there are good reasons to abstain from criminalizing sex that is ob-
tained without previous disclosure of material facts, there are exceptional cases 
in which criminalization may be warranted. The most obvious example is the 
failure to disclose a dangerous STD. These kinds of cases were discussed in 
some length in Section IV.B. of this Article. 
 
2. Abstain from Criminalizing Deception that Furthers Privacy or 
Autonomy Interests 
 
There are some cases in the sexual context in which the use of deception di-
rectly or indirectly furthers the privacy interests of the deceiving party. The case 
of the Scottish transgendered man discussed in the Introduction is a good ex-
ample. The man was convicted of sexual assault by fraud for hiding his gender 
history from his girlfriend.251 Without minimizing how the man’s failure to dis-
close may have infringed on his girlfriend’s informational autonomy, a strong 
case can be made in favor of not punishing this kind of deception. 
The problem with punishment in cases like this is that the defendant’s deci-
sion to hide information about his gender history can be justified as a way of 
furthering his privacy interests. To impose a duty to disclose his gender history 
would force him to reveal very personal information that he may legitimately 
want to keep private. It can plausibly be argued that in cases like this the harm 
to informational autonomy that is caused by the lack of disclosure is out-
weighed by the harm to privacy that would be caused if disclosure is required. 
Privacy interests could also be implicated in cases in which defendants 
make assertions regarding their feelings for the other person. We may have 
good reasons for not wanting judges involved in figuring out whether expres-
sions of love are sincere. Any process designed to ferret out the sincerity of such 
assertions will inevitably end up delving into private matters that should not 
generally be of concern to a liberal polity. 
 
3. Other Cases 
 
There are surely other cases in which sex obtained by deception causes seri-
ous harms that transcend the infringement of the victim’s informational auton-
omy. Perhaps some cases of sex by deception cause considerably more emo-
tional harm than others. If so, the argument in favor of punishing sex by 
deception gets stronger in direct proportion to the amount of emotional harm 
caused by the deception. 
Compare the following two cases. In the first case, a Ryan Seacrest look-
alike convinces a diehard fan of Seacrest’s to have sex with him by falsely claim-
ing that he is, in fact, the celebrity. In the second case, a man obtains sex from 
his longtime girlfriend after courting her for months and falsely claiming that 
 
251. Sex Fraud Woman Put on Probation, supra note 6.  
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he will marry her, that he is childless, and that he is single. While the deception 
in both cases can be described as material to the victim’s decision to have sex, 
the second case will likely cause considerably more emotional harm than the 
first. If so, the arguments in favor of criminalizing the second case are stronger 
than those in favor of punishing the first. We may still abstain from criminaliz-
ing the second case if we find that the emotional harm caused is not of a suffi-
cient magnitude to trigger the imposition of criminal liability. Still, the case for 
criminalization is stronger in this case than in cases where less emotional harm 
is caused. 
There are doubtless many other cases of sex by deception that cause serious 
emotional harm in addition to the infringement of informational autonomy. A 
comprehensive discussion of such cases exceeds the scope of this Article. Never-
theless, a sound general rule when approaching these cases is that the more se-
rious the emotional harm that is caused by the deception, the stronger the ar-




The history and nature of modern rape reform, coupled with an analysis of 
the meaning and scope of consent and autonomy, reveal that the best under-
standing of contemporary rape doctrine is as a body of law that seeks to protect 
against coerced sex. While sex obtained by deception is obviously problematic, 
it simply does not raise the same concerns that sex obtained by coercion does 
under conditions of male dominance. It is thus unsurprising that modern rape 
statutes broadly criminalize coercion but only selectively punish deception. As a 
result—and contrary to what Rubenfeld argues—our current approach to rape-
by-deception does not threaten to unravel the conceptual framework upon 
which modern rape law is erected. 
While there is no inherent tension between a view of rape that primarily 
seeks to prohibit coerced sex and the refusal to broadly criminalize sex by de-
ception, I have provided some guiding principles that may help courts and leg-
islatures decide when to criminalize sex obtained by deception. The suggested 
approach would only selectively criminalize sex obtained by deception. In con-
trast to what Rubenfeld suggests, such selective criminalization is not incompat-
ible with the kind of sexual autonomy that lies at the core of modern rape stat-
utes. The riddle of rape-by-deception is thus solved. 
 
